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ENERGY COST REDUCTION ACT, ECONOMIC 
FEDERALISM, AND A MODERN APPROACH TO 
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATURAL 
GAS ACT OF 1938 
Benjamin T. McCall* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The saying “you can’t get there from here” is as authentically Maine as 
blueberries or lobster.  Made famous in the mid-20th century by the storytelling 
troupe Bert and I, the colloquial phrase typifies the quirkiness and wit that one 
often encounters north and east of the New Hampshire border.1  Despite the attempt 
at humor, the saying is apropos when one considers Maine’s position in both New 
England and the country.  Being at the end of the line certainly has its advantages, 
among them being hundreds of square miles of untamed forest, and a bevy of 
natural resources that provide both sustenance and stunning vistas.  However, 
isolation is a double-edged sword.  For many years, Maine has struggled to revive a 
once vibrant manufacturing sector2 and following the “Great Recession”3 Maine’s 
economic growth has been sluggish, especially when compared to the rest of New 
England.4  In this struggle, the high price of energy, especially for industrial 
customers, has been a cause for concern.5  The recent closing of Verso’s paper mill 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law.  The author wishes to thank 
Professor Jeffrey Thaler for plugging the numerous gaps in my knowledge and for his incredible eye for 
the missing comma.  In addition, many thanks go to Tim Schneider for his mentorship and for being an 
invaluable source of information and motivation.  Last, but certainly not least, my eternal gratitude to 
Meg for resisting the urge to roll her eyes at every mention of energy law over the past year.    
 1. Comprised of Marshall Dodge, Bob Bryan, and later Tim Sample, the troupe travelled all over 
Maine and beyond, giving voice to the rare type of humor that one finds “Down East.”  The famous 
saying “well you can’t get there from here” (recited in the traditional accent) was originally included in 
the story “Which Way to Millinocket?”     
 2. See Ariel Sabar, Maine Struggling to Revive Ailing Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/29/us/29maine.html?_r=0; Our View: As Mills Lose Value, Maine Towns Lose 
Tax Revenue, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/09/22/our-view-as-
mills-lose-value-maine-towns-lose-tax-revenue/.  
 3. Definition of 'The Great Recession', INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-
recession.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).   
 4. Statistics: Economic Growth in Connecticut, Maine Slowest in New England Since Recession, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 21, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Statistics-Economic-
growth-in-Connecticut-Maine-5704104.php.  
 5. Nell Gluckman, LePage Says Cost of Energy Keeps Wages Low, Drives Business from Maine, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 3, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2014/09/03/politics/lepage-says-cost-of-
energy-keeps-wages-low-drives-business-from-maine/; Lori Valigra, Oil, Propane Expected to Remain 
Stalwarts as Mainers Try New Energy Sources, MAINEBIZ (Sep. 8, 2014), 
http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20140908/CURRENTEDITION/309049987/oil-propane-expected-to-remain-
stalwarts-as-mainers-try-new-energy-sources.     
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in Bucksport,6 and the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Great Northern Paper 
Company in Millinocket,7 with both companies blaming high energy costs as a 
precipitating factor in their demise, highlights the ongoing problem.8           
The winter of 2013 brought Maine’s energy issues front and center.  Maine’s 
energy bills already outpaced national averages,9 due in part to the State’s heavy 
reliance on oil to heat homes during the cold winter months.10  Yet it was not the 
cost of heating oil, but the cost of the “cheaper alternative,” natural gas, that proved 
most problematic.  Over the past fifteen years, Maine and New England have 
become reliant on natural gas to generate the lion’s share of its electricity,11 with 
Maine using natural gas as its primary fuel for generating nearly half of its daily 
electricity needs.12   
However, despite a new abundance of natural gas resources in Pennsylvania 
and New York,13 New England currently faces a significant lack of transportation 
infrastructure to bring needed natural gas to the region.14  Without the necessary 
pipelines, natural gas prices in New England continue to outpace those in the rest 
                                                                                                     
 6. Kevin Miller, Energy Costs Among Chief Culprits in Bucksport Mill’s Demise, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/03/energy-costs-among-chief-
culprits-in-bucksport-mills-demise/ (“The Bucksport mill remained idle for most of January and 
February [2014] to ride out the worst of the energy costs”).  
 7. J. Craig Anderson, Critical Concerns Arise in Great Northern Bankruptcy Case, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/02/critical-concerns-arise-in-great-
northern-bankruptcy-case/.   
 8. See Miller, supra note 6 and accompanying text; Anderson, supra note 7 and accompanying 
text.  
 9. Maine: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last visited Jan. 31, 
2015), http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=ME#tabs-5.  Maine ranks 30th in the United States in terms of 
energy consumption per capita; however, Maine ranks 11th in the United States in terms of energy 
expenditures per capita.    
 10. See id.  Over 70% of Maine households heat their homes with heating oil, the highest 
percentage of any state in the country.    
 11. Northeast Grows Increasingly Reliant on Natural Gas for Power Generation, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13751.   
 12. Id.; see also ISO-NEW ENGLAND, INC., Maine: 2013-2014 State Profile (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/nwsiss/grid_mkts/key_facts/final_me_profile_2014.pdf.  
Maine uses natural gas in numerous ways.  Many Maine homes heat with natural gas in the winter.  
Additionally, large mechanical and industrial plants power their operations with natural gas.  These uses 
would potentially benefit from the influx of new natural gas supply.  However, the primary issue is the 
lack of natural gas to power Maine – and New England’s – electricity generators, which leads directly to 
higher electricity generators.     
 13. Here’s Why Marcellus Shale Play Is So Important for Chesapeake, FORBES (Sep. 26, 2014, 1:45 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/09/26/heres-why-marcellus-shale-play-is-so-
important-for-chesapeake/; see also Kathryn Skelton, As Natural Gas Brings Down Electricity and 
Heating Costs, Maine Can’t Get Enough, LEWISTON SUN JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2013, 7:55 AM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/02/03/business/as-natural-gas-brings-down-electricity-and-heating-
costs-maine-cant-get-enough/.  Located underneath parts of New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and Ohio, the Marcellus Shale is the largest natural gas reserve in the United States.  Recent estimates 
state that the formation holds 141 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves.  Production has steadily 
increased over the last seven years, from less than 2 billion cubic feet per day in 2007, to 16 billion 
cubic feet per day in 2014.     
 14. Short Term Energy Outlook Supplement: Constraints in New England Likely to Affect Regional Energy 
Prices This Winter, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ 
steo/special/pdf/2013_sp_01.pdf.  
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of the country.15  For example, while the Henry Hub16 price, rose thirty-five 
percent17 in 2013, the price at the Algonquin Citygate Exchange,18 which services 
New England, rose sixty-five percent.19  This problem was most evident in January 
of 2013, as a number of cold snaps forced New England’s electricity generators 
into overdrive.20  Even so, the pipeline bottleneck to the South ensured that 
available gas was purchased at a significant premium.21  As a consequence, Maine 
ratepayers bore the brunt of the price increase.  Some residential ratepayers saw 
their bills rise by nearly fifty percent (from the previous winter).22  Additionally, 
large industrial customers saw prices rise so high that some were forced to cease 
operating during peak demand times.23 
As the snow melted, Maine decided to take action.  The Omnibus Energy Bill 
of 201324 was seen by many to be the most significant piece of energy legislation 
passed by the Maine Legislature in a generation.25  The key component of the bill 
                                                                                                     
 15. New England and New York Have Largest Natural Gas Price Increases in 2013, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14491#; see also Randy 
Billings, LePage Urges Federal Regulators to Fast-Track Natural Gas Pipelines, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD (Sept. 30, 2014, 12:44 AM), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/09/30/lepage-urges-federal-
regulators-to-fast-track-natural-gas-pipelines/ (noting that while Maine has the lowest electricity rates in 
New England, the region far outpaces the rest of the country, paying 15.08 cents per kWh in July 2014, 
compared to 11.01 cents per kWh for the rest of the country).  
 16. Located in Erath, Louisiana, the Henry Hub Index is generally regarded to represent the 
benchmark price for wholesale natural gas in the United States, as it serves as the interconnection point 
for over a half dozen pipelines from the Gulf of Mexico, delivering natural gas to much of the southern 
and western portions of the country.  
 17. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 14.  The price increased to $3.73 per million British 
thermal units (MMBtu).  
 18. The Algonquin Citygate index is a key trading point for natural gas supply to Boston and the 
greater New England region.  It takes its name from the Algonquin Pipeline, owned by Spectra Energy, 
which represents a significant source of natural gas for New England.  SUSSEX REPORT, infra note 212 
at 12.    
 19. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 14.  
 20. Winter Natural Gas Price Spikes in New England Spur Generation from Other Fuels, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10791#.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Whit Richardson, Natural Gas Prices in Maine ‘Volatile at Times’ this Winter, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/01/25/business/natural-gas-prices-in-
maine-volatile-at-times-this-winter/.   
 23. Tux Turkel, Some Maine Mills Forced to Idle Lines as Price of Power Soars, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/12/19/ 
mills_forced_to_idle_lines_as_price_of_power_soars/; see also Whit Richardson, Verso Paper Mills in Maine 
Experience Massive Increase in Natural Gas Costs, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 10, 2013), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/05/10/business/verso-paper-mills-in-maine-experience-massive-increase-
natural-gas-delivery-costs/. 
 24. L.D. 1559 (126th Legis. 2013).  
 25. See John Cleveland, Barry Hobbins & Kenneth Fredette, How the Omnibus Energy Bill Will Cut 
Costs for Consumers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 3, 2013, 10:42 AM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/  
06/03/opinion/contributors/how-the-omnibus-energy-bill-will-cut-costs-to-consumers/ (“Our historic, 
bipartisan omnibus energy legislation directly attacks one of the biggest problems facing the Maine 
economy: We pay too much for energy in Maine.”); see also Scot Thistle, Legislature Passes Energy 
Measure, Bill to Allow UMaine to Compete for Wind Power Project, LEWISTON SUN JOURNAL (June 27, 
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addressed Maine’s lack of natural gas pipeline capacity.26  Noting the resulting 
burden on ratepayers, The Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act (“ERCA” or “the 
Act”) authorized the Maine Public Utilities Commission to “execute an energy cost 
reduction contract . . . for the transmission of [no more than 200 million] cubic feet 
of natural gas per day or for [no more than] $75,000,000 annually.”27  In doing so, 
the Legislature hoped that the “expansion of natural gas transmission capacity into 
[Maine would] result in lower natural gas prices and, by extension, lower electricity 
prices for consumers in [Maine].”28  Speaking on the floor of the Maine House of 
Representatives, House Republican Leader Kenneth Fredette stressed the impact 
that such legislation could have: “[This Bill has the potential to] reduce the cost of 
energy in Maine by at least $200 million a year by erasing what’s called the basis 
differential.29  It will help protect jobs in our mills, keep people employed and 
allow for future economic development here in the State of Maine.”30  The 
Legislature agreed with this sentiment.  The Bill was moved out of the Joint 
Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities, and Technology with a 12-1 “ought to 
pass” report,31 and despite the veto by Governor LePage,32 became law on June 26, 
2013.33  On March 20, 2014, the Maine Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) 
initiated an adjudicative proceeding to study the feasibility of entering into an 
energy cost reduction contract (“ECRC”) as allowed under the ECRA.34    
                                                                                                     
2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/06/27/politics/state-house/legislature-passes-energy-measure-
bill-to-allow-umaine-to-compete-for-wind-power-project/.  
 26. L.D. 1559, Part B, ch. 19 (126th Legis. 2013). 
 27. Id. § 1904.  It is important to note that § 1904(1) imposes two significant conditions precedent 
to the execution of a contract.  First, the Maine PUC must pursue rule changes that could potentially 
reduce the basis differential.  Id. § 1904(1)(A).  If the Commission decides that these rule changes 
would have “substantially the same cost reduction effects [as the introduction of new pipeline capacity]” 
then those must be pursued.  Id.  If not, the Commission must “[e]xplore all reasonable opportunities for 
private participation” in securing additional pipeline capacity.  Id. § 1904(1)(B).  Of course, private 
investment in this area has certain advantages, and arguably fewer drawbacks, than public intervention 
would.  If neither of these options is available, then the PUC was allowed to hire an independent 
consultant to study the feasibility and potential impact of the public purchase of pipeline capacity.  Id. § 
1904(1)(C).  There were many groups who argued that an expansion of reliance on natural gas was poor 
environmental planning.  See, e.g., Tux Turkel, Group Challenges Maine, New England Gas-Line 
Expansion Plan, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/05/29/gas-pipeline-plan-for-maine-and-new-england-gets-pushback/.  
Nonetheless, despite this opposition, the Examiners’ Report in the ensuing PUC proceeding concluded 
that no future market reform or private involvement could effectively solve this basis differential 
problem.  Examiners’ Report, infra note 218, at 31-32 (noting that it is impossible to tell at this juncture 
whether the combination of market rule changes and private investment would be sufficient to solve the 
problem, therefore concluding that under the precepts of the ECRA, the Commission would entertain 
proposals from interested pipeline companies).     
 28. Id. § 1903(2).  
 29. Id. § 1902(1) (“‘Basis differential’ means the difference between the so-called Henry Hub spot 
price for natural gas and the corresponding cash spot price for natural gas in New England.”).  
 30. 3 Legis. Rec. H-1155 (1st Reg. Sess. 2013) [hereinafter Fredette Testimony].   
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. P.L. 2013, ch. 369, § B-1 (emergency, effective June 26, 2013). 
 34. Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for Exercising Authority Pursuant to 
the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 35-A M.R.S. § 1901, No. 2014-71, Notice of Investigation and 
Opportunity to Intervene (Me. P.U.C. Mar. 20, 2014). 
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The process that ensued has been contentious.35  Natural gas pipeline 
companies were eager to utilize the Maine PUC’s newfound authority to subsidize 
the cost of pipeline expansion.36  Conversely, many environmental groups 
remained skeptical that expanding Maine’s natural gas usage is a sound long-term 
investment, both in terms of costs to ratepayers, and the effect on the State’s carbon 
emissions.37  Despite these disagreements, the general consensus among lawmakers 
was that something needed to be done to lower Maine’s energy prices and make the 
state more competitive for business.38  The risks were far outweighed by the 
rewards.39   
Up to this point, no state had endeavored to intervene in a natural gas market 
in this fashion.40  As such, the passage of the ECRA, and its subsequent 
implementation, operated in unchartered territory, leaving many questions 
unanswered—primarily whether Maine possessed the constitutional authority 
needed to implement an energy cost reduction contract.41  As such, this Comment 
explores the Act and presents it as a test case for analyzing the constitutionality of 
state-sponsored purchases of new energy supply through the dual microscope of 
                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., Stephen Singer, Portland Lawyer Makes Case Against Conservation Law Foundation, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sep. 7, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/09/08/portland-
lawyer-makes-case-against-conservation-law-foundation/.  
 36. See, e.g., Darren Fishell, Maine Regulators Asked to Decide Whether to Charge Electricity 
Ratepayers for Natural Gas Expansion, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:42 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/09/18/energy/maine-regulators-asked-to-decide-whether-to-charge-
electricity-ratepayers-for-natural-gas-expansion/ (“Kinder Morgan and Spectra are seeking to sign up a 
mix of local gas distribution companies and both likely will seek to have the state (of Maine) commit to 
capacity to support pipeline expansion plans.”).   
 37. See, e.g., Darren Fishell, Environmental Group Challenges Basis for New England Natural Gas 
Pipeline Buildout, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jun. 27, 2014, 3:00 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/06/27/business/environmental-group-challenges-basis-for-new-england-
natural-gas-pipeline-buildout/; Greg Cunningham, Maine energy bill is “ill-advised gamble,” BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (May 27, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/05/27/opinion/contributors/maine-energy-bill-is-ill-
advised-gamble/.  
 38. 3 Legis. Rec. H-831 (1st Reg. Sess. 2013) (“This bill represents an unprecedented bipartisan 
solution to one of Maine’s most pressing issues, the cost of energy.  It will do great things to reduce the 
costs we all pay to power our homes and heat them, and our businesses that do business in the State of 
Maine.”).    
 39. 2 Legis. Rec. S-1060 (1st Reg. Sess. 2013) (“Is there [sic] risk in voting for this?  Absolutely.  
There is [also] risk in not voting for this.  There is risk if we don’t do this in losing some of our most 
substantial employers in the state of Maine that are hanging by their fingernails, waiting for some 
energy relief . . . .”).   
 40. See, e.g., Darren Fishell, Maine Utility Regulators Split on New Fee for Natural Gas Pipeline 
Capacity, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:43 PM), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2014/11/17/business/maine-utility-regulators-split-on-new-fee-for-natural-
gas-pipeline-capacity/ (quoting Maine PUC Commissioner David Littell) (“No commission or state has 
ever done a gas pipeline contract such as this . . . .”); Jack Cashman, Maine Voices: PUC Must Proceed 
Cautiously When Investing in Pipeline Infrastructure,  PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/05/13/maine_voices__puc_must_proceed_cautiously_when_investing
_in_pipeline_infrastructure (“This is uncharted territory.  No commission in the country has committed 
electric ratepayers to own natural gas pipeline capacity.”). 
 41. Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for Exercising Authority Pursuant to 
the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 35-A M.R.S. § 1901, No. 2014-71, Brief of the Conservation 
Law Foundation (Me. P.U.C. Aug. 22, 2014) at 23-24 [hereinafter CLF Brief].  This issue was first 
brought to the author’s attention by the Conservation Law Foundation in their brief submitted to the 
Public Utilities Commission in this ongoing matter.  
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preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause.  This Comment concludes that the 
ECRA—and analogous future state actions—pass both tests.42  
First, Part II of the Comment explores the history of federal regulation of the 
natural gas industry.  Beginning in the early parts of the 20th century, this Comment 
surveys how early courts attempted to draw the bounds of federal regulation of 
natural gas, a decidedly interstate commodity, and balance these interests with the 
attempts of States to better protect their own citizens.  Next, in Parts II(b) and II(c), 
this Comment looks at the Natural Gas Act of 1938.43  The NGA remains the 
controlling document in this area of law, solidifying the regulatory jurisdiction of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the FERC”) with regard 
to interstate sales of natural gas.44  Due to the NGA’s pervasive reach, significant 
questions remain as to whether Maine may pass laws and enter into contracts that 
have the potential to impact a sphere of influence typically controlled by the federal 
government.  To this point, some detractors have argued that Maine should not go 
forward with procuring an energy cost reduction contract,45 as such action is almost 
certainly preempted.46   
Part III explores the concept of preemption in the context of the NGA.  To be 
sure, the authority of the NGA is extensive; however, it is not absolute.  The 
legislative history of the NGA is explicit that the Act is meant to supplement, not 
                                                                                                     
 42. The scope of this Comment’s analysis is limited to actions subject to Congress’s grant of 
jurisdiction to FERC under the Natural Gas Act.  While it is possible to extrapolate this analysis to a 
state action subject to federal regulatory action under the Federal Power Act, as the history and purpose 
of both acts are considered similar, it would be inappropriate to posit that this analysis is applicable to 
any and all state energy actions – it is not.  Nevertheless, the themes and modes of analysis explored in 
this Comment could prove useful in analyzing future problems in this area.    
 43. Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717(z) (2010)).  Although this 
Comment focuses on natural gas, it is important to note that in the development of subsequent case law, 
courts have often treated the regulation of natural gas in the same way as they do the regulation of 
electricity under the Federal Water Power Act (41 Stat. 1063 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828(c) 
(2010)).  In fact, Part III deals with recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals in regard to 
electricity generation with the assumption that principles regarding preemption and the scope of 
regulatory ability of FERC to be theoretically identical under the power granted to them under both the 
FPA and NGA.  Many scholars have highlighted the historical fact that the NGA and FPA were passed 
months apart, each hoping to provide the FPC with the same ability to regulate the wholesale markets 
for these two pivotal fuels.  See, e.g., DeVane, infra note 284, at 31; David S. Bell, Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Power Commission Under the Natural Gas Act—Comingled Gas, 24 LA. L. REV. 600, 600 n.1 
(1964).  As such, this Comment confidently presents recent cases involving the procurement of 
additional electricity capacity and strong authority for the constitutionality of analogous actions 
involving the procurement of additional natural gas capacity.     
 44. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 748 (1981) (FERC has the exclusive authority “to 
regulate the wholesale pricing of natural gas in the flow of interstate commerce from wellhead to 
delivery to consumers.”); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954) 
(“[T]he [FPC has] jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce . . . 
.”).  For the purposes of clarity, this Comment will refer to the federal regulatory agency as the FPC in 
all cases occurring before 1977, when the agency was dissolved and reconstituted as FERC.   
 45. See, e.g., CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 23-24.  
 46. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 
108 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption 
doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”).  
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overwrite, the authority of the states.47  In that light, this Comment explores how 
states are able to affect local energy policies without frustrating federal purposes.  
Drawing from scholarship and case law,48 this Comment defines and applies a 
more nuanced approach to the topic of NGA preemption that is particularly useful 
in analyzing the ECRA.  Dubbed “the modern theory of NGA preemption,” this 
Comment distinguishes state actions that affect wholesale energy rates—expressly 
preempted by the NGA—and actions that merely affect a commodity price by 
increasing demand for that particular commodity.  These actions are not expressly 
preempted by the NGA, nor do they come into conflict with the NGA’s field of 
authority, or overall purpose.     
Part IV of this Comment explores Maine’s ECRA from two distinct angles.  
First, the modern theory of NGA preemption is applied.  This Comment proposes 
that despite affecting the interstate price of natural gas, the ECRA is not preempted, 
as this effect is both limited to the “law of supply-and-demand” and congruent with 
stated Congressional priorities.  Second, Part IV explores the interconnected issues 
posed by the ECRC relating to the dormant Commerce Clause.49  The ECRA 
attempts to reduce the price of natural gas consumed in Maine, by increasing the 
available supply.  The question Part IV explores is whether such action 
discriminates against out-of-state interests in a way that conflicts with the sole 
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.50  This Comment argues that 
in contrast to the seminal cases in this area, Maine’s potential purchase of pipeline 
capacity via an ECRC does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  This is the 
case because in the context of the Act, Maine operates as a participant in an 
otherwise defunct market, not as state regulator.  Such action falls within the 
clause’s market participant exception,51 and is not subject to Commerce Clause 
analysis.         
Finally, Part V of this Comment will explore the next steps in the legal and 
market processes.  Maine is operating in new legal territory, never before attempted 
by a state.52  Although the ability to directly effect such change has profoundly 
beneficial ramifications for Maine and New England, this is an area of law that 
requires vigilance on the behalf of state and federal regulators.  Part V will explore 
these possibilities and suggest ways to ensure that states are able to affect change in 
a way that is responsive to the market, while still protecting the interests of citizens 
and ratepayers.   
                                                                                                     
 47. See DeVane, infra note 284 and accompanying text.  
 48. See infra notes 135, 186, and 252 and accompanying text.  
 49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 50. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); City of Philadelphia. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617 (1978); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).  
 51. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (“Nothing in the purposes 
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from 
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over states.”).  
 52. See supra note 40.  
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 
A.  The Wild, Wild Midwest: Before the Natural Gas Act 
  The early years of the natural gas industry in the United States saw multiple 
gas distributors operating in each major city.53  However, the work of several 
theorists quickly changed the country’s natural gas landscape.54  In particular, John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Henry Farrar, and Henry Carter Adams noticed that the 
burgeoning natural gas market would be more efficient and profitable if it 
collapsed, allowing a single, large company to displace smaller competitors.55  
Despite making economic sense, these theorists also recognized the inherent risks 
in an increasingly monopolistic industry.  For example, Farrar and Adams posited 
that increased profits created by a natural gas monopoly would increase the 
personal wealth of the company’s owners, instead of being passed along in the 
form of consumer savings.56  As such, both supported a compromise solution: a 
“single firm structure for the gas distribution market, with that firm subject to 
government control to insure that the reduced costs attributable to the unusual 
structure were reflected in reduced prices.”57 
The natural gas industry also changed dramatically with the introduction of 
interstate pipelines.  Early pipelines were built with wood; however, the genesis of 
steel models made the transportation of natural gas faster and far less expensive.58  
The benefits of these new innovations were obvious: natural gas companies were 
able to boost the volume of gas transported as well as the size and scale of their 
market impact.59  Additionally, natural gas customers saw the average price per 
BTU60 decrease.61   
In the nascent stages of natural gas expansion, states became wary of the 
industry’s increasing strength and attempted to regulate their activities, drawing 
upon the long history of public interest regulation enshrined in the states’ police 
                                                                                                     
 53. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 25 
ENERGY L.J. 57, 58 (2004). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 58-60.  All three found that laissez faire competition in this area would lead to 
unnecessarily high costs.  Thus, as the natural gas industry promised massive economies of scale, this 
early work supported the theory that by eliminating duplicitous facilities and pipeline systems, the 
industry’s future profits could increase dramatically.   
 56. Id. at 59.   
 57. Id. 
 58. NOLAN E. CLARK & GLENN W. CLARK, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS AND GAS: PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS, AND THE COMMODITY MARKET ALTERNATIVES 7 (1984).  The use of 
steel allowed for natural gas to be transported at much higher pressures than before, thereby increasing 
the speed and volume transported. 
 59. Pierce, supra note 53, at 60.  
 60. BTU is an abbreviation for “British Thermal Unit.”  The BTU is a common measure of natural 
gas capacity in the industry and is equal to the amount of heat needed to raise the temperature of one 
pound of water one degree Fahrenheit.  Definition of B.T.U., DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/btu (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).  
 61. Pierce, supra note 53, at 60.  
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powers.62  Viewing natural gas as a public good, states attempted to limit company 
power in order to ensure that the public’s interest was served.63  In particular, many 
states passed statutes that formed utilities commissions to regulate the intrastate 
activities of these companies.64  Most statutes empowered utilities commissions to 
review the rates charged by a company, imposing on each the burden of proving 
that such rates were just and reasonable.65  Companies that failed to meet this 
burden often found their rates invalidated.66 
Inevitably, state regulation led to legal challenges.  In Public Utilities 
Commission for Kansas v. Landon,67 two natural gas companies challenged 
Kansas’s authority to regulate the price of natural gas charged by its local 
distribution affiliates to individual customers.68  These two companies maintained a 
series of pipelines that transported gas throughout Kansas, Missouri, and 
Oklahoma.69  Their gas was taken by local distribution companies (“LDCs”), 
owned by the pipeline companies, and then sold on to end users.70  However, 
Kansas and Missouri attempted to regulate both the wholesale price charged by the 
companies, as well as the “burner tip” price charged by the LDCs to individual 
customers.71  The companies sought injunctive relief to prevent the States from 
enforcing these regulations.72  The trial court ruled for the companies, finding that 
their business was “interstate commerce of a national character [and] that the 
commissions’ actions interfered with the establishment and maintenance of 
reasonable sale rates and thereby burdened interstate commerce and took the 
receivers’ property without due process of law . . . .”73  The United States Supreme 
Court agreed in part and reversed in part.74  The Court agreed that the 
transportation of natural gas across state lines was interstate commerce, and 
therefore subject to review under the Commerce Clause.75  However, the Court 
found that the sale of natural gas by LDCs to local customers was outside the 
stream of interstate commerce, and thus, was properly regulated by state public 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876) (“[The Constitution] does authorize the 
establishment of law requiring each citizen to so conduct himself . . . as [to] not unnecessarily injure 
another.  This is the very essence of government . . . From this source come the police powers . . . .”).  
 63. Id. at 126 (“Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make 
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.  When, therefore, one devotes his property 
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and 
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus 
created”).  
 64. Cathryn Neaves, Proper Legal Analysis, Improper Result: Recent History of Judicial 
Preemption Interpretation of the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act, 23 SUFFOLK U.  L. REV. 829, 
832 (1989).  
 65. Id. at 833.  
 66. Id. 
 67. 249 U.S. 236 (1919), vacated, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Kan. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 590 (1919).  
 68. Landon, 249 U.S. at 242.  
 69. Id. at 243.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 244. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 244-45.  
 75. Id. at 245. 
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utilities commissions without placing a burden on interstate commerce.76   
The Court revisited these issues one year later in Pennsylvania Gas Company 
v. Public Service Commissioner of the Second District of New York.77  Here, a 
company transported natural gas from Pennsylvania into New York to sell directly 
to customers.78  Unlike Landon, the company did not employ the use of an LDC, 
but instead sold directly off its pipeline to local consumers.79  Nevertheless, the 
Court held that the regulation of retail rates was local in nature, and outside the 
realm of interstate commerce.80  The Pennsylvania Gas decision reaffirmed the 
bifurcation of natural gas regulation: interstate transportation was subject to 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, but the regulation of local companies and 
local sales remained within the sole purview of the states. 
The most significant case of the pre-NGA era, however, was Missouri ex rel. 
Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Company.81  There, a company was producing gas 
in Oklahoma and transporting it by way of a pipeline that passed through 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri, and then reselling it to unaffiliated retail 
companies.82  Problems arose when the company sought to increase its rates for 
transporting natural gas in both Kansas and Missouri without seeking the approval 
of either state’s public utilities commission.83  Both states brought suit, seeking to 
enjoin the company from raising its rates.84  The United States Supreme Court 
rejected the states’ argument.85  In contrast to both Landon and Pennsylvania Gas, 
the Court held that the company’s activities did not contain a ‘local component’ 
necessary for the states to impose regulation.86  Despite the company selling and 
delivering its product to local distribution companies, the Court refused to 
distinguish this part of the business from its larger interstate component.87  As such, 
the Court established that the wholesale distribution and resale market for natural 
gas was entirely an interstate transaction, thereby eliminating the ability for states 
to exercise control.88  Further, and perhaps more importantly, the Court sent a clear 
signal to Congress that their regulatory intervention into the natural gas market was 
                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 245-46.   
 77. 252 U.S. 23 (1920) [hereinafter Pa. Gas]. 
 78. Id. at 27-28. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 31 (“While the manner in which the business is conducted is part of interstate commerce, 
its regulation in the distribution of gas to local customers is required in the public interest and has not 
been attempted under the superior authority of Congress”).   
 81. 265 U.S. 298 (1924) [hereinafter Kan. Gas].   
 82. Id. at 305.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 306.  
 85. Id. at 310.  
 86. Id. at 308.  
 87. Id. at 309 (“[H]ere the sale of gas is in wholesale quantities, not to consumers, but to 
distributing companies for resale to consumers in numerous cities and communities in different states.  
The transportation, sale and delivery constitute an unbroken chain, fundamentally interstate from 
beginning to end, and of such continuity as to amount to an established course of business.”).  
 88. Id. 
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badly needed.89 
B.  The Natural Gas Act: Congress Enters the Fray 
The Court’s decision in Kansas Gas, as well as other cases involving the 
interstate sale of electricity and natural gas,90 began to raise red flags in 
Washington D.C.  Congress heard concerns from all sectors of the utility industry; 
most were worried about the expanding influence of, and discriminatory tactics 
utilized by, the now unregulated interstate pipeline companies.91  Congress thus 
directed the Federal Trade Commission to investigate.92  The resulting report 
detailed the abuses perpetrated by a largely unregulated monopoly.93 
Following this investigation, Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act of 1938 
(NGA).94  The Act’s opening statement forcefully stated the situation being 
addressed:  
[A]s disclosed in reports of the Federal Trade Commission [and] other reports 
made pursuant to the authority of Congress, it is declared that the business of 
transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is 
affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation in matters relating to the 
transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign 
commerce is necessary in the public interest.95 
The Act explicitly granted the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) jurisdiction 
over the transportation, and sale of natural gas, as well as any facilities used in this 
business.96  In short, Congress had laid claim to the area of authority identified by 
the Court in Kansas Gas and had now staked out its role as the sole regulator of 
natural gas moving in interstate commerce.    
C.  Defining the Scope and Bounds of the NGA 
Despite the strong claim of authority stated in the NGA’s opening paragraph, 
the scope of federal regulation under the Act has been the subject of much debate.  
Given the events preceding the Act’s passage, Courts have generally held that 
Congress intended the NGA to protect consumers from large natural gas companies 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 308 (“But Congress thus far has not seen fit to regulate [the interstate natural gas 
market], and its silence, where it has the sole power to speak, is equivalent to a declaration that that 
particular commerce shall be free from regulation.”).  
 90. See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) 
(analogizing Kan. Gas, supra note 81, and holding invalid the attempt of Rhode Island to regulate prices 
charged for electricity in interstate commerce); Pennsylvania. v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600 
(1923) (invalidating competing state regulations that sought to force natural gas companies to give 
preference of delivery to customers living within their respective state).   
 91. Pierce, supra note 53, at 61.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Report of FTC to U.S. Senate, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A 
(1936)).   
 94. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-771(z) (2005)) 
(citations omitted).  
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2005).  
 96. Id. § 717(b).   
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charging excessive rates for wholesale shipments.97  Additionally, Courts have 
worked under the assumption that the NGA grants exclusive authority to the FPC 
(now FERC) to regulate the wholesale natural gas market, particularly the prices 
charged by pipeline and distribution companies.98  Nonetheless, many regulated 
companies sought to challenge this wide interpretation of the NGA’s grant of 
authority.  
The authority of the FPC under the NGA was first challenged fewer than ten 
years after the bill’s passage.  In Interstate Natural Gas Company v. FPC,99 the 
Court unanimously affirmed the FPC’s ability to force interstate pipeline 
companies to reduce their rates.100  Interstate owned and operated over 100 natural 
gas wells in northern Louisiana.101  Most of the gas that Interstate produced was 
transported via its own system of pipelines to local distribution companies in 
Louisiana.102  However, Interstate sold its excess supply to three pipeline 
companies that transported that gas to markets in other states.103  Thus, when the 
FPC opened proceedings to examine the rates that Interstate charged these other 
pipeline companies, Interstate challenged the intervention as exceeding the 
agency’s authority under the NGA.104  In particular, Interstate believed that as it 
sold its gas supply to other companies within the state of Louisiana, the only state 
in which Interstate operated, its activities fell outside the flow of interstate 
commerce, and therefore the exercise of authority pursuant to the NGA would 
impede Louisiana’s jurisdiction in this area.105  The Court disagreed.106  In 
particular, the Court held that the gas produced by Interstate moved “in a constant 
flow from the mouths of the wells from which it is produced through pipe lines 
belonging to Interstate to the compressor station of the respective purchaser and 
thus into and through states other than Louisiana . . . .”107  While the Court 
recognized that Louisiana did maintain some regulatory authority over areas of 
local concern, it rejected the notion that concerns about overlap with state interests 
were sufficient to trump federal priorities.108  Thus, after Interstate, the modus 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (“The purpose of the 
Natural Gas Act was to underwrite just and reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas.”); FPC v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) (holding that the NGA was meant “to protect 
consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.”).   
 98. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindh, Lessons from the California ‘Apocalypse:’ 
Jurisdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3 (2001); Pierce, supra note 53, at 63.   
 99. 331 U.S. 682 (1947) [hereinafter Interstate].  
 100. Id. at 693.  
 101. Id. at 684.  
 102. Id. at 684-85.   
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 687; Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United .States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
Schechter, a poultry manufacturer and packager operated exclusively in the State of New York.  Like 
Interstate Gas Co., Schechter made the argument that its activities were conducted outside of the control 
of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.  However, unlike Interstate, Schechter was successful 
(or at least lucky) in this argument as its case was heard less than two years before appointments to the 
Court made by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt changed Commerce Clause jurisprudence forever.  
 106. Interstate, 331 U.S. at 687. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 691-92. 
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operandi in analyzing federal authority over interstate wholesales of natural gas is 
that “[e]xceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction [to the FPC under the NGA] 
are to be strictly construed.”109                   
This view was both affirmed and cemented seven years later in Phillips 
Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin.110  Phillips was a fully integrated energy 
company, which, among other businesses, collected and sold natural gas for resale 
to interstate pipeline companies.111  Nonetheless, when the FPC opened an 
investigation into the company’s business practices and rates, Phillips argued that 
as it did not participate in the transportation of natural gas, rather it was exempt 
from federal oversight under the NGA.112  The Court again disagreed,113 adamant 
that the NGA granted oversight authority over any company engaged in the 
interstate wholesale of natural gas, regardless of what degree they participated in 
the movement of such product.114  Further, the Court was clear that the NGA gave 
the federal government nearly unlimited control over the wholesale of natural gas 
in interstate commerce, in order to fill the gap left by state regulation that had been 
ruled unconstitutional.115  But, above all, the Court in Phillips reminded the country 
that the NGA was created for the “[p]rotection of consumers against exploitation at 
the hands of natural-gas companies” and that “attempts to weaken” this result by 
reading the NGA narrowly would not be tolerated.116  
Although Phillips clarified the goal and reach of the NGA, questions remained 
regarding what regulatory role, if any, Congress meant to leave to the states in 
achieving this goal.  The prevailing view was that the NGA was intended to plug 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 690-91 (emphasis added).  
 110. 347 U.S. 672 (1954) [hereinafter Phillips].  
 111. Id. at 674-75.  
 112. Id. at 675-77.  
 113. Id. at 677.  
 114. Id. (“In our view, the statutory language, the pertinent legislative history, and the past decisions 
of this Court all support the conclusion . . . that Phillips is a ‘natural-gas company’ within the meaning 
of that term as defined in the Natural Gas Act, and that its sales in interstate commerce of natural gas for 
resale are subject to the jurisdiction of and regulation by the Federal Power Commission.”).  
 115. Id. at 683-84 (internal citation omitted) (“There can be no dispute that the overriding 
congressional purpose was to plug the ‘gap’ in regulation of natural-gas companies . . . . A significant 
part of this gap was created by cases holding that ‘the regulation of wholesale rates of gas and electrical 
energy moving in interstate commerce is beyond the constitutional powers of the states.’ . . . [W]e are 
satisfied that Congress sought to regulate wholesales of natural gas occurring at both ends of the 
interstate transmission systems.”).  
 116. Id. at 685.  Consumer protection was, many argue, the primary purpose behind the Natural Gas 
Act, with subsequent doctrines, e.g. the federal government’s exclusive control over interstate prices, 
flowing from this.  Although modern scholarship has largely glossed over this part of the NGA’s 
history, some have noticed it.  See, e.g., Joseph Fagan, From Regulation to Deregulation: The 
Diminishing Role of the Small Consumer Within the Natural Gas Industry, 29 TULSA L.J. 707, 712 
(1994) (“Wishing to minimize any adverse effects from potentially anticompetitive practices, Congress 
drafted the NGA with the clear intention of protecting the individual consumer.  Its main focus was to 
guarantee the consumer a reliable source of natural gas at a price determined to be reasonable.”); Brian 
D. O’Neill & George M. Knapp, Oil Pipeline Regulation After Williams: Does the End Justify the 
Means? 4 ENERGY L.J. 61, 65 (1983) (noting FERC’s holding in Williams Pipeline Co., 21 FERC ¶ 61, 
260 (1982), which specifies that the particular purpose of the NGA was to protect consumers); Francis J. 
Coleman, Jr., FPC Natural Gas Allocation: Curtailment in Context, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1370, 1385 (1972) 
(noting the unfortunate tendency of the FPC (now FERC) to shift its regulatory emphasis under the 
NGA away from consumer protection and towards inducing production).      
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the hole identified in Kansas Gas, thereby creating a unified scheme for national 
natural gas regulation in order to better protect consumers.117  The federal 
government would regulate wholesale natural gas that traversed multiple state 
borders, while the states retained the ability to regulate retail rates and 
conditions.118    
Finally, the Court’s decision in Northern Natural Gas Company v. Kansas 
Corporation Commission is noteworthy.119  Northern Natural Gas had entered into 
over 125 purchase contracts with various natural gas producers in Kansas, all of 
which had been approved by the FPC.120  Then Kansas passed a statute whereby the 
state utility commission could “regulate the taking of natural gas from any and all 
common sources of supply . . . and to prevent unreasonable discrimination . . . in 
favor of or against any producer . . . .”121  Under this law, Kansas required Northern 
Natural Gas to take gas from wells at a rate no higher than any other producer, 
meaning that the supply it was able to purchase from each of the 1,100 wells 
connected to its pipeline was cut back.122  The Kansas District Court and Supreme 
Court each upheld the order,123 finding that the statute regulated the local 
“production and gathering” of natural gas, which was exempted from federal 
control under the NGA.124   
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court held that the terms “production 
and gathering” only involved the “physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth 
and preparing it for the first stages of distribution.”125  Therefore, the Kansas order 
must be preempted, as it invaded the exclusive regulatory domain of the FPC.126  In 
particular, the Court found that the Kansas order was preempted because it affected 
the wholesale price of interstate gas, an issue clearly under the purview of the 
NGA.127  Despite Kansas’ arguments that enforcing ratable extraction “in no way 
                                                                                                     
 117. Pierce, supra note 53, at 63 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 
621, 631 (1972) (internal citations omitted) (“The Natural Gas Act of 1938 granted FPC broad powers 
to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies . . . Although federal 
jurisdiction was not to be exclusive, FPC regulation was to be broadly complementary to that reserved 
to the states, so that there would be no gaps for private interests to subvert the public welfare.”)); see 
also Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“The [NGA] takes no authority from State Commissions, and is so drawn as to 
complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory authority.”).  
 118. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986); see also Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S 591, 610 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that 
the NGA was designed to “take no authority from State commissions and was so drawn as to 
complement and in no matter usurp State regulatory authority.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Panhandle E. 
Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 502-03 (1949) (“[S]uffice it to say that the [NGA] did not envisage federal 
regulation of the entire natural-gas field to the limit of constitutional power.  Rather it contemplated the 
exercise of federal power as specified in the Act, particularly in that interstate segment which the states 
were powerless to regulate because of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.”).         
 119. 372 U.S. 84 (1963) [hereinafter Northern]. 
 120. Id. at 87. 
 121. Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 122. Id. at 89-90. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2009).  
 125. Northern, 372 U.S. at 89.  
 126. Id. at 93.  
 127. Id. at 90; see also Fels & Lindh, supra note 98, at 3.  
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involves the price of gas,”128 the Court ruled that even the indirect regulation of 
contractual matters was preempted by the NGA.129  The Court clearly stated that 
the NGA instituted “a comprehensive scheme by federal regulation of ‘all 
wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company 
or not and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate 
pipeline company.”130  Furthermore, “the federal regulatory scheme leaves no room 
either for state regulation of price of interstate wholesales of natural gas, or for 
state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result.”131   
Here, the Court found that Kansas’s regulatory action had impeded the ability 
of the federal government to regulate the interstate flow and the wholesale price of 
natural gas.132  In particular, Kansas’s action interrupted the “intricate balance” that 
the federal government hoped to achieve in the interstate market.133  Although a 
conflict between the state regulation and the federal scheme was not inevitable, the 
Court held that state regulations (such as the Kansas order) that were aimed at 
interstate wholesale purchasers “must be declared a nullity in order to assure the 
effectuation of the comprehensive federal regulation ordained by Congress.”134  
D.  The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Natural Gas Wellhead Control Act 
of 1989 
Complete federal control can have its downsides.  Nearly forty years after the 
passage of the NGA, policy makers and energy analysts began to realize that 
federal control over natural gas wellhead prices had, in fact, precipitated a shortage 
of supply.135  In response, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
(“NGPA”).136  Among other outcomes, the NGPA partially deregulated wellhead 
prices of “new” natural gas deposits, meaning that certain categories of natural gas 
sold at the wellhead would no longer be subject to direct price regulation.137  
Unfortunately, while many commentators saw Congress’s intention to be the 
                                                                                                     
 128. N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 364 P.2d 668, 668 (Kan. 1961) (“As we tried to 
point out in the opinion as filed, this case in no way involves the price of gas.”).  
 129. Northern, 372 U.S. at 91.  
 130. Id. (citations omitted).  
 131. Id. (emphasis added).  
 132. Id. at 98.   
 133. Id. at 92.   
 134. Id. (emphasis added).  
 135. Stephen F. Williams, Federal Preemption of State Conservation Laws After The Natural Gas 
Policy Act: A Preliminary Look, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 524 (1985); see also Natural Gas Policy Act 
of 1978, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ 
ngmajorleg/ngact1978.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015, 8:47 PM) (“Gas produced for interstate 
commerce [under the NGA regime] was subject to price ceilings that arguably were becoming an 
increasingly strong constraint that prevented market clearing.”)  It is worth noting that less than a year 
after the publication of this article then Professor Williams was appointed by President Reagan to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the court primarily charged with 
reviewing the actions of federal regulatory agencies, including FERC.  Judge Williams assumed senior 
status in 2001. 
 136. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 
(1988)).  
 137. Williams, supra note 135, at 524-25 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3313 (1982)).   
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eventual return of a free market for wellhead sales,138 the NGPA’s division of 
natural gas supply into separate regulated and unregulated categories created a 
great amount of confusion and uncertainty.139  In part noticing these classification 
issues, Congress repealed significant portions of the NGPA by way of passage of 
the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 (“NGWDA”).140  The NGWDA 
completely eliminated price controls on first sales of natural gas,141 beginning in 
1993,142 rather than beginning on January 1, 2000, as called for by the NGPA.143  
Despite the elimination of wellhead price controls, both Congress and the courts 
were clear that the passage of the NGPA “did not compromise the comprehensive 
nature of federal regulatory authority over interstate gas transactions,”144 although 
it did not foreclose the ability of the states to set maximum prices for the first sale 
of natural gas produced within its borders.145   
III. ENERGY POLICY LABORATORIES: THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF STATES 
UNDER THE NGA 
A. E Pluribus Unum: The New Role of States in Large-Scale Energy Purchases 
As this Comment discusses above, the central purpose of the NGA was to 
bridge the gap between the states’ ability to regulate intrastate energy production 
and sale, and their collective inability to regulate energy passing in interstate 
commerce.146  Without effective federal regulation, the possibility existed that 
consumers would face increasing prices, while monopolistic energy companies 
profited.147  Today, high energy prices continue to be of concern.148  However, the 
responses from both state and federal bodies differ from those of past decades.  
Although the United States functions as one nation, each region has its own 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 524, n. 25.  
 139. Richard G. Morgan & Martha P. Patterson, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of 
Practice and Two Years to Make Perfect, 71 KY. L.J. 105, 105 (1982) (“[T]he NGPA’s deregulation 
provisions have caused, and will continue to cause, substantial problems and heated debate.”).   
 140. Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3432 (1989)).  
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (1989) (repealed 1993).  
 142. Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989: Description and Impact, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ngact1989.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014, 1:23 PM). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 2930, 3000 n. 6 (1988); see also Transcon. Gas 
Pipe Line Corp. v. Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409, 421 (1986) (“The NGPA . . . does not 
constitute a federal retreat from a comprehensive gas policy.”).  
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 3432(a) (2009).  In sum, the NGPA eased the extent of federal control, but 
attempted to do so in a way that would not cede any of its exclusive control over interstate wholesale 
prices.  The NGPA is not central to the issue explored in this Comment, but is instructive when looking 
at the scope of federal control of the natural gas industry over time.   
 146. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin., 347 U.S. 672 (1954).   
 147. See Pierce supra note 53, at 62.  
 148. See, e.g., Ralph Vartabedian, U.S. Electricity Prices May Be Going Up for Good, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-power-prices-20140426-
story.html#page=1; James Taylor, Electricity Prices Soaring in Top Wind Power States, FORBES (Oct. 
17, 2014, 8:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2014/10/17/electricity-prices-soaring-in-
top-10-wind-power-states/.   
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individual energy challenges and priorities.  For some regions, a focus on 
household energy efficiency has been effective in reducing overall demand.149  For 
other regions, a focus on renewable energies has helped alleviate burdens on the 
local electric grid.150  Yet for others, experimenting with renewable fuels and 
efficiency measures is insufficient; instead, states and municipalities have sought to 
incentivize the purchase of additional capacity for certain fuels, or the construction 
of additional generation assets in order to meet their unique challenges.  In 
particular, New England’s high dependence on natural gas for electricity generation 
has necessitated the development of innovative strategies to keep prices from 
jumping to untenable levels.   
The central challenge is allowing each region to address its individualized 
needs, while maintaining a federal energy policy that recognizes the need for more 
centralized control over certain policies and resources.  This was the challenge that 
Congress recognized in passing the Natural Gas Act.  The regulation of each 
individual state was no longer practical, nor was it effective to prevent large-scale 
industry from taking advantage of consumers.151  This primary purpose of the NGA 
is still alive today.  Yet it is difficult to mesh this overarching priority with 
allowing individual states, like Maine, to take action that may bolster some federal 
priorities while hindering others.  This section thus explores the concept of 
preemption, first generally, and then in the context of natural gas regulation, in 
hopes of identifying what role, if any, may be maintained for states in this pivotal 
area of law.  
B.  A Preemption Primer 
The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI of the Constitution, states that both 
the laws and treaties passed by Congress are the supreme law of the land.152  The 
concept of preemption naturally flows from this dictate, as Chief Justice John 
Marshall famously articulated in the seminal case, Gibbons v. Ogden.153  Here, the 
State of New York had awarded a local company a virtual monopoly for operating 
                                                                                                     
 149. California’s Energy Efficiency Success Story: Saving Billions of Dollars and Curbing Tons of 
Pollution, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (July 2013), http://www.nrdc.org/energy/ca-
efficiency-success-story.asp (citing both the Governor of California, and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration in concluding that California’s energy efficiency initiatives had helped lower the average 
California electricity bill to 25 percent below the national average).  
 150. Green Power Program: Frequently Asked Questions, NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, 
http://www.nypa.gov/doingbusiness/Customers_FAQsV.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2014, 10:47 AM).  
New York provides renewable energy credits, or RECs, to any customer who is willing to purchase 
electricity generated by renewable sources.  The credits will make up the difference between the often-
higher price of renewable energy, and standard offer rates that are predominately generated by more 
traditional fuel types; see also Renewable Energy In Hawai’i, HAWAI’I CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE, 
http://www.hawaiicleanenergyinitiative.org/renewable-energy/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014, 11:01 AM).  
This is a joint venture of the State of Hawai’i and the United States Department of Energy to create 
incentives and incubator programs that will hopefully lead to Hawai’i producing 70% of its electricity 
needs from renewable sources by 2030.   
 151. See generally Phillips, 347 U.S. at 672. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).  
 153. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  
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steamboats between New York City and neighboring ports in New Jersey.154  
However, a rival boat company that possessed a federal license to operate in the 
same waters, was cited in violation of the statute.155  The Court struck down the 
New York law, as it violated Congress’s exclusive power to regulate interstate 
commerce.156  In so doing, Justice Marshall declared that “acts of the State 
legislatures . . . [that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress [are to 
be invalidated because] in every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and 
the law of state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must 
yield to it.”157 
The United States Supreme Court’s default position has been to assume that 
federal and state laws are compatible.158  To reduce the possibility that state and 
local authority might be unnecessarily superseded, the Court first looks to 
Congressional intent to determine whether a particular area of law was reserved 
exclusively for federal control.159  Should such intent be identified, preemption can 
found in two distinct ways.  First, express preemption can be found if Congress has 
clearly indicated this intent by the inclusion of preemptive language within the bill 
itself.160  For example, the federal government has complete authority with regards 
to radiation safety around nuclear power plants,161 and more notably, over all 
aspects of immigration policy.162  Second, conflict preemption can be found where 
a state law frustrates or prevents the achievement of a federal objective.163  In some 
                                                                                                     
 154. Id. at 1-2.  
 155. Id. at 2.  
 156. Id. at 168.  
 157. Id. at 211.  
 158. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal citations omitted) (“[We] start 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
 159. Id. (internal citations omitted) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchtone . . . .”); see 
also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (a preemption analysis starts “with the 
assumption that the history powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . [a] Federal Act unless 
that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”); Gade v. Natl. Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 
U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (“The question of whether a certain state action is 
preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.”); N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 
U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (citation omitted) (“Congress . . . should manifest its intention clearly . . . the 
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.”).   
 160. See, e.g., The Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2014) 
(requiring that this law “supersedes any and all State laws insofar as they may not or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan.”).  
 161. Donald E. Jose & Michael A. Garza, The Complete Federal Preemption of Nuclear Safety 
Should Prevent Scientifically Irrational Jury Verdicts in Radiation Litigation, 26 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 1, 9 n.53 (2007) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 208 (1983) (“[T]he safety of nuclear technology was the exclusive business of 
the federal government.”)).      
 162. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (emphasis added) (“[T]he supremacy of the 
national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization 
and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution . . . .”).  
 163. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (Conflict preemption applies “where under the circumstances of [a] particular case, 
the [challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”).  
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instances, discerning a conflict is rather simple.164  However, in many more 
instances, Congressional intent is murky, and thus, finding whether an 
impermissible conflict exists is far from simple.165  In these cases, determining 
whether a conflict exists often depends on how the court characterizes the federal 
purpose involved.166 
In the field of energy, preemption analyses have become exceedingly 
complicated.  It is common wisdom that “if FERC has jurisdiction over a subject, 
the States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject,”167 and “[e]ven where 
state regulation operates within its own field, it may not intrude indirectly on areas 
of exclusive federal authority.”168  Today, FERC’s primary activities reside in 
regulating the interstate flow of electricity, including the activities of interstate 
transmission companies.169  In this area, FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction is clear.170  
 However, as noted above, the line between federal and state authority under 
the NGA is far fuzzier.  Early cases interpreting the NGA were quick to point out 
that the clear Congressional purpose of the Act was to complement existing state 
regulations in order to better protect consumers, not to usurp areas of traditional 
state authority, including the regulation of production within state borders, and of 
local distribution companies.171  However, this issue is often revisited and the 
nuances are striking.    
Within the federal government’s reserved powers has been the regulation of 
wholesale natural gas pricing.172  Beginning with Northern and continuing into the 
present day, very few have challenged this authority.  Yet what remains unclear is 
the extent to which complimentary state laws may reside within this realm, as 
Northern failed to identify any limiting principle to Congress’ influence.173  Some 
recent decisions have found that the entire field of wholesale natural gas pricing is 
                                                                                                     
 164. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 135-36 (1913).  A Wisconsin law prohibited 
the labeling of maple syrup in a manner mandated by federal law.  The United States Supreme Court 
held that Congress maintained the express authority to require certain labels be affixed to products in 
order to protect citizens from harmful products. 
 165. EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 391 (2d ed. 2002).   
 166. Id. at 398.  
 167. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  
 168. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 274 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 169. Federal Power Act, 48 Stat. 863 (1920), §§ 201, 205, 206 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b), (d), 
(e) (2013)).  FERC also maintains oversight in the areas of hydroelectric dams, as well as the interstate 
transportation and rates of oil and natural gas.  
 170. See, e.g., FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964); Appalachian Power Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 812 F.2d 898, 904 (4th Cir. 1987); Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynergy, Inc., 
375 F.3d 831, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[Wholesale 
energy rates set by FERC] must be given binding effect by state authorities. . . .”).     
 171. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944).  
 172. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1963). 
 173. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (10th ed. 2014) (obstacle preemption (or conflict 
preemption): “The principle that federal or state statute can supersede or supplant state or local law that 
stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of the overriding federal or state 
law.”)  I use “complimentary” in this context to denote a state law that would not pose an obstacle or 
conflict to the federal government’s achievement of a power or duty denoted in the NGA.  
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the dominion of FERC,174 while others are wary of granting exclusive power for 
fear of trampling on traditional state authority.175  This level of disagreement 
suggests, as Professor Chemerinsky warns, that discerning Congressional intent, 
and thus the need for preemption can be complicated.176  
C.  Murky at Best: What Effect May States Have on Wholesale Price? 
Under traditional rules of preemption, the Court’s decision in Northern 
suggests that FERC had either preempted the field177 of the regulation of 
wholesales of natural gas, or at least that any statute with an effect on these prices 
would pose an inherent conflict with federal priorities.178  Yet the evolution of 
federal wellhead price controls following enactment of the NGPA and the 
NGWDA suggests that this rule is more nuanced than it is absolute, as Congress 
has indicated a willingness to allow states to take on more of a regulatory role.  
This void potentially leaves space for state regulations that attempt to benefit 
citizens (within the entire ethos of the NGA) while avoiding conflicts with existing 
federal priorities. 
  For example, Judge Williams has suggested that the NGPA indicated 
willingness by Congress to allow benign state regulations to withstand preemption, 
despite indirectly affecting the wholesale price of natural gas.179  He conceived of a 
situation where a state action ordering natural gas producers to take more supply 
for sale would not be preempted under the NGPA, despite the Court’s past decision 
in Northern.180  While such an order could conceivably raise the price of natural 
gas for local consumers, Judge Williams posited that it would be very difficult for a 
court to find implied preemption, as the regulation would remain consistent with 
                                                                                                     
 174. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2013) .”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Congress intended to occupy the field to the exclusion of 
state law by establishing through the NGA a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of all 
wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce; see also State ex rel. Johnson v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 
289 P.3d 1186, 1193 (Nev. 2012) (“From a practical standpoint, if each state intervened in [the natural 
gas regulation] field with different regulation, the result would be a maelstrom of competing regulations 
that would hinder FERC’s oversight of the natural gas market.  We cannot conclude that this is what 
Congress intended through the use of purposeful deregulation [under the NGPA].”).  
 175. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 515 (1989) (“[C]onflict 
preemption analysis must be applied sensitively in [the area of natural gas regulation], so as to prevent 
the diminution of the role Congress reserved to the States while at the same time preserving the federal 
role.”).  
 176. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 165, at 391-93. 
 177. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2005).  State actions are not expressly preempted by the NGA.  The 
history of the NGA’s passage, both legislative and otherwise, makes this clear.  When analyzing a state 
action for preemption issues, the question is whether it affects wholesale pricing in a way that is not 
accepted by Northern, or whether the state action is in conflict with the law’s consumer-protection aim.  
Judge Williams, supra note 135, at 535, begins to carve out exceptions to the general rule proposed by 
the Supreme Court in Northern.  
 178. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963). 
 179. Williams, supra note 135, at 535.   
 180. Id. at 534-35. 
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the federal objectives identified in the NGA and NGPA.181   
In this vein, Judge Williams proposed a new test for implied preemption under 
the NGA.  Rather than declaring that “any state action that risked increasing the 
price of natural gas for ultimate consumers was necessarily preempted,”182 he 
argued that “[t]he primary standard should now be whether the state action is 
congruent with the development of the sort of market that Congress sought to 
achieve.”183  Combining these thoughts with the NGA’s purpose,184 it seems 
reasonable to conclude that if state regulation furthers this dual purpose locally, in a 
manner that does not interfere with the federal government’s achievement of this 
goal on a national scale, courts may be hesitant to pull the preemption trigger.  
Furthermore, this theory suggests a role for states in ongoing regulation of natural 
gas specifically, and the creation of energy supply policy generally.  This role 
would allow states to experiment with various local energy procurement policies, 
whether they help to produce renewable fuels, or increase investment in existing 
commodities.  The only difficulty with this theory would be ensuring that these 
state regulations are not wholly inconsistent with the goals of Congress expressed 
in the NGA—or the FPA in the case of electricity.185     
Although this premise has not been tested before the United States Supreme 
Court, or in the context of natural gas, two recent Federal Court of Appeals 
decisions have put Judge Williams’ premise into action.  First, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the Federal Power Act preempted 
a New Jersey law that had incentivized the increased production of electricity.186  
The State of New Jersey had adopted the “Long Term Capacity Pilot Program 
Act,”187 which called for the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to “promote the 
construction of new generating facilities in the state” in hopes of increasing the 
amount and reliability of the state’s electricity supply.188  However, New Jersey did 
not pay for these facilities itself, but instead promised any interested supplier the 
                                                                                                     
 181. Id. at 535 (“The NGPA’s premise, that a healthy, competitive wellhead market can and ought to 
be achieved, might give rise to an inference that state legislation facilitating the development of such a 
market is generally welcome.”).  
 182. Id. at 536. 
 183. Id. (emphasis added).  
 184. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(b) (2014) (stating that the purpose of the Act as a whole is to protect 
end-consumers from being exploited by natural gas behemoths, while keeping rates at a just and 
reasonable level).  
 185. In my opinion, Judge Williams’ theory highlights the best mode of analysis available regarding 
interpretation of the NGA.  The history of the NGA highlights Congress’ intent to bridge the gap 
between state regulations in order to protect consumers.  To that end, the law has been successful, as 
producers and transporters are subject to the same regulation regardless of the destination of their 
product.  As Judge Williams makes clear, it was not the intent of Congress to prevent states from taking 
independent action to affect change within their borders, or even within a region.  As such, preempting 
any action that affects price is not congruent with Congressional purpose.  Instead, the dual-purpose of 
the NGA: protecting consumers, and uniformly regulating market participants, need to be considered 
equally when conducting a preemption analysis in this area.  
 186. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2014); see also supra note 43 
(explaining why cases involving the federal regulation of electricity are analogous to this Comment’s 
discussion of natural gas).   
 187. Id. at 245-46.  
 188. Id. at 246. 
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ability to charge a set rate for their supply for the subsequent fifteen years.189  The 
Third Circuit declared that the Federal Power Act preempted the law, as the federal 
government “has exclusive control over interstate rates for wholesales of electric 
capacity.”190  Despite being achieved in a unique fashion, the court concluded that 
by guaranteeing the price of that any intrastate producer could charge, the effect 
was to augment the federally regulated clearing price, thereby creating a different 
price than what FERC intended.191 
Second, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found a 
similar program in Maryland also to be preempted by the FPA.192  As in Solomon, 
Maryland was concerned with the low volume of electricity being generated within 
its borders.193  As such, Maryland sought to incentivize an increase in production 
by promising to pay a generator the difference between their clearing price, and a 
fixed twenty-year rate set by the Maryland Public Service Commission.194  These 
contracts for differences (“CfDs”) would be paid for by ratepayers, via long-term 
contracts that the state would compel some of its local electric distribution 
companies to enter.195  Similar again to Solomon, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the 
program, finding that it impinged on the federal government’s exclusive authority 
to regulate interstate wholesale rates.196  In language familiar to this area of law, the 
court stated that despite doing so indirectly, the Maryland program had violated the 
bright line between federal regulation of wholesale rates, and state regulation of 
local distribution and generation.197 
D.  “Enlarging the Supply of Capacity”: A Glimmer of Hope for State 
Interventions into Generation and Capacity Markets 
Following Solomon and Nazarian, it may appear that Judge Williams’ earlier 
thesis rings hollow.  How can a state hope to affect a downward trend in rates, 
either for electricity or natural gas, without frustrating federal goals?  Especially in 
New England, where energy costs continue to rise,198 both decisions seem to 
reiterate that a nearly impenetrable wall surrounds the federal government’s 
jurisdiction on this issue.  However, one avenue to affect change appears to remain 
open.  
A background in economics is not necessary to see the proper equation.  Both 
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 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 252-53.  
 192. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 480 (4th Cir. 2014).  
 193. Id. at 473.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 473-74. 
 196. Id. at 475-76.  The court also rejected Maryland’s argument that the program was not preempted 
because it did not interrupt the market price of electricity as set by federal auctions.  Despite this being 
factually accurate, the court held that by guaranteeing a certain price for generated electricity, regardless 
of what price a generator may receive at auction, Maryland was “superseding” federal regulatory 
authority.  
 197. Id. (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 900 F.2d 269, 274 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Even 
where state regulation operates within its own field, it may not intrude indirectly on areas of exclusive 
federal authority.”).         
 198. See supra notes 9, 14, and 15.   
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Solomon and Nazarian involved scenarios where a state regulatory body sought to 
increase the generation of electricity by creating financial incentives for 
generators.199  The hope was that by increasing generation assets, and thus the 
overall supply of electricity, the price would fall.  Unfortunately for both Maryland 
and New Jersey, this outcome was achieved by paying generators to generate, 
thereby changing the federally regulated price that a generator could receive.  
These actions stepped over the line.  However, in his Solomon opinion, Judge Julio 
Fuentes skillfully points out an exception to this general rule.    
First, Judge Fuentes noted the unprecedented nature of the decision, mainly the 
fact that the New Jersey law presented one of the first times that a state action had 
attempted to solve a prevailing energy shortage by way of a ratepayer funded 
program.200  Yet while the incentivizing of generation was preempted by the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate rates, the Third Circuit rejected 
FERC’s argument that a state would also be field preempted if its regulations had 
an incidental effect on a market price simply because it increased supply.201  In 
fact, the Court draws a strong distinction between the two: “[t]he law of supply-
and-demand is not the law of preemption.  When a state regulates within its sphere 
of authority, the regulation’s incidental effect on interstate commerce does not 
render the regulation invalid.”202  This incidental effect is contrasted with the 
actions analyzed in Nazarian and Solomon, both of which sought to change 
incentives in a way that directly overrode the price-setting authority of the federal 
government.  In contrast, Judge Fuentes found that states certainly maintain the 
authority to select types of generation to be built and where they will be built as 
well.  These are places where states have always maintained authority, and 
“FERC’s authority over interstate rates does not carry with it exclusive control over 
any and every force that influences interstate rates.”203   
This statement of the law takes from, and improves upon, the United States 
Supreme Court’s statement in Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Kansas.204  
There, the Court distinguishes Northern Natural Gas Company v. Kansas,205 by 
finding that a Kansas law that threatened to cancel natural gas producers’ 
entitlements to certain gas fields, should they reduce purchases and cut supply, was 
not preempted under the NGA.206  According to the Court, state regulation of 
production rates could not be field preempted under the NGA, even if those 
regulations had an incidental effect on wholesale prices.207  Twenty-five years later, 
Solomon represents an expansion of this doctrine, thereby including state 
regulations of generation and capacity expansion.  This step follows logically.  If 
                                                                                                     
 199. Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248; Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 473.    
 200. Solomon, 766 F.3d at 254 (internal citations omitted) (“This is the first time we have a state law 
to address state long-term energy needs under a state procurement paid for by state rate payers . . . .”).  
 201. Id. at 255. 
 202. Id. (emphasis added).  
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 204. 489 U.S. 493, 514 (1989) [hereinafter Nw. Cent.] (“To find field pre-emption of Kansas’ 
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 205. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).   
 206. See generally Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 497-98.   
 207. Id. at 514. 
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under Northwest Central, a state may directly regulate production in a manner that 
has an effect on an otherwise federally regulated area, it would hold that a state 
wishing to indirectly affect price by simply increasing capacity for a certain energy 
source would likewise be permitted to do so.   
Consequently, Judge Williams’ theory, combined with the backing of Solomon 
and Northwest Central, come together to create a modern theory of NGA 
preemption.  Unlike the more rigid opinions in Northern and Phillips, this theory 
reserves a small role for state actions consistent with Congressional intent.  This 
theory recognizes that despite its nature as a national industry, states have always 
been allowed to experiment with policies designed to protect its citizens and benefit 
the state as a whole.  After all, the NGA’s central purpose as a consumer-protection 
mechanism208 should allow states to undertake measures that will better serve its 
citizens, assuming they do not cross into the exclusive control of the FERC.  Thus, 
this modern theory suggests that merely affecting—indirectly—the interstate price 
of natural gas by working to increase supply is not an automatic death-sentence, but 
an effect that must be analyzed in context, and with regard to the overall priorities 
embodied in federal legislation.  
This modern theory of conflict preemption under the NGA and NGPA has the 
potential to open up a number of interesting possibilities for states that have 
become frustrated with the current energy prices.  Maine is one such state.  This 
Comment will now explore the contours of the ECRA, and analyze its effects under 
this new framework.  
IV. A PIECE IN THE NGA PREEMPTION PUZZLE:  
DOES THE MAINE ECRA FIT? 
A.  A Brief History of MPUC 2014-71 
As this Comment noted in Part II, the continued rise in natural gas prices in 
both Maine and New England is due in large part to the lack of sufficient pipeline 
capacity to transport adequate supply into the region.209  It is this problem that the 
ECRA hopes to solve.210  Stated plainly, “[i]t is in the public interest to decrease 
prices of electricity and natural gas for consumers in this State [and the] expansion 
of natural gas transmission capacity into this State . . . could result in lower natural 
gas prices and, by extension, lower electricity prices for consumers in this State.”211      
 Commissioned by the State, the report of Sussex Economic Advisors 
highlighted the significant capacity-related problems facing Maine and New 
England.212  First, the report highlighted the gravity of the region’s problems, 
                                                                                                     
 208. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.   
 209. See Tux Turkel, Maine Businesses Can Expect Electricity Rate Shock This Winter, PORTLAND 
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 210. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1903 (2013).  
 211. Id.  
 212. SUSSEX ECONOMIC ADVISORS, MAINE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: REVIEW OF NATURAL 
GAS CAPACITY OPTIONS (2014), available at http://www.iso-
ne.com/committees/comm_wkgrps/othr/egoc/mtrls/2014/mar62014/maine_puc_gas_study_022614.pdf 
[hereinafter SUSSEX REPORT].  The report was commissioned by the Maine PUC following the passage 
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particularly the elevated price of natural gas that New England (and Maine in 
particular) was being forced to pay.213  Then, the report highlighted the significant 
constraints placed on New England’s pipeline capacity,214 as well as the number of 
potential options to increase that capacity being offered by various market 
participants.215  Finally, the report analyzed the potential effects of the purchase of 
additional pipeline capacity.  Although dotted with caveats, the report concluded 
that Maine ratepayers would experience certain benefits from the execution of an 
ECRC.216  
However, following the deterioration of regional efforts to purchase a greater 
amount of pipeline capacity,217 some parties involved in the administrative proceeding 
worried that acting alone, Maine would not be able to make a sizable dent in the 
overall price of natural gas, thus charging ratepayers for improvements that would not 
directly benefit them.218  The Sussex Report had warned that if Maine acted 
                                                                                                     
of the ECRA, and was in fact mandated by the Act as the initial step to be taken in deciding whether or 
not Maine should purchase pipeline capacity under this new authority.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 1904(1)(c) 
(alteration in original) (“In consultation with the Public Advocate and the Governor’s Energy Office, 
[the PUC must] hire a consultant with expertise in natural gas markets to make recommendations 
regarding the execution of an energy cost reduction contract.”).    
 213. Id. at 7. In particular, Sussex noted that during the 2012/2013 heating season, there were 25 
instances where New England was paying at least $10 more per MMBtu than the average price 
represented by the Henry Hub index.   
 214. Id. at 12-29.  In particular, the report noted that four significant power generators—Salem 
Harbor, Vermont Yankee, Brayton Point, and Norwalk Harbor—were all scheduled to be 
decommissioned in the next three years.  These plants represent ten percent of New England’s total 
electricity generation capacity.  However, since none of the four use natural gas, their retirement will 
place further pressures on the already insufficient system, possibly causing an additional increase in 
market prices. 
 215. Id. at 35-40.   
 216. Id. at 60 (“[T]he introduction of new pipeline capacity into a constrained region will reduce the 
basis differential between that region and the Henry Hub natural gas price index.”). 
 217. In December of 2013, all six New England governors signed an accord to explore joint efforts to 
increase pipeline capacity into the region.  The effort, coordinated in part by the New England States 
Committee on Electricity (NESCOE), hoped to bring state decision makers and energy stakeholders to 
increase the amount of natural gas coming into New England by approximately 1 Bcf/day. New England 
Governors Announce Proposal to Expand Regional Energy Infrastructure, ISO NEWSWIRE (Jan. 28, 
2014, 4:26 PM), http://isonewswire.com/updates/2014/1/28/new-england-governors-announce-proposal-
to-expand-regional-e.html.  However, the group announced in August of 2014 that their collective effort 
would be stalled until further notice.  The primary factor in this decision was the failure of the 
Massachusetts Legislature to pass a bill aimed at allowing Massachusetts utilities to enter into long-term 
contracts to purchase Canadian hydroelectricity.  See Jon Chesto, Gov. Patrick Backs Away From 
Regional Effort to Expand Natural Gas Capacity, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:55 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2014/08/gov-patrick-backs-away-from-
regional-effort-to.html?page=all.  Without a regional effort, a great amount of debate within the Maine 
PUC surrounded whether the limit of 200 mmCf/day would be sufficient to make a dent in the overall 
needs of Maine.  Yet, recent electoral changes in the region, particularly the election of Governor 
Charlie Baker in Massachusetts, may signal a thawing of the regional effort.  See generally Bruce 
Gellerman, As Winter Electricity Prices Jump, Mass. Debate Over Natural Gas Pipelines Heats Up, 
WBUR (Mar. 10, 2015) https://www.wbur.org/2015/03/10/natural-gas-pipelines.  Only time will tell 
what the final outcome will look like.     
 218. Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for Exercising Authority Pursuant to 
the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 35-A M.R.S. §1901, No. 2014-71, Examiners’ Report (Me. 
P.U.C. Oct. 1, 2014) at 13 [hereinafter Examiners’ Report]. 
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independently, even to the upper-limit of its statutory authority, the resulting addition 
of capacity would likely “not . . . have a substantial effect on the basis premium            
. . . .”219  This worry was echoed by the PUC hearing examiners, who concluded “that 
it is unlikely that the benefits to Maine consumers will exceed the costs of pipeline 
capacity if the . . . State of Maine enters into an [ECRC] . . . .”220  
 However, many other parties found that the possible drawbacks were far 
outweighed by the effect of increasing energy prices on ratepayers.  Despite the 
deterioration of a regional effort, The Brattle Group (writing on behalf of the Office 
of the Public Advocate (“OPA”)) concluded that state intervention might be 
necessary to correct a possible market failure.221  Further, the OPA noted that the 
pipeline constraints in the winter of 2013 had “increased Maine electricity costs by 
more than $180 million.”222  The bottom line, the OPA warned, was that energy 
prices, and their negative effects on consumers, showed no signs of reversing 
course.223   
Noting these divergent views, the Commission staff gave preliminary approval 
to a request for proposals to be submitted to companies interested in constructing 
and selling capacity to the state.224  
                                                                                                     
 219. SUSSEX REPORT, supra note 212, at 62.  
 220. Examiners’ Report, supra note 218, at 1.  This was also a worry, among many, voiced by the 
Conservation Law Foundation.  Id. at 13.    
 221. Id. at 31 (internal citation omitted) (“[B]asis differentials appear to exceed the cost of new 
capacity while fundamentals are arguably tightening, and yet no market participants . . . are signing up 
for firm transportation service to support capacity expansion.”).  
 222. Id. at 8.  
 223. Id.  The exact degree of this increase in price is unknown.  However, looking at the standard 
offer rate for electricity in Maine is helpful.  The standard offer rate is the default rate for electricity 
supply that a Maine customer automatically pays.  See Maine Office of the Public Advocate, Electricity: 
Electricity Providers (Supply), http://www.maine.gov/meopa/utilities/electric/supply.html (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2015). Currently, the standard offer rate of Central Maine Power, the state’s largest provider, is 
7.56 cents per kWh.  Id.  It was believed that when the Maine PUC solicited bids for the new standard 
offer price in January of 2015, the new price would rise to between 9 and 11 cents per kWh.  See E-mail 
from Timothy Schneider, Maine Public Advocate, to author (Nov. 11, 2014, 22:46 EST) (on file with 
author).  A general rule of thumb is that an increase of 1 cent per kWh will cost the average Maine home 
$5.50 a month or $66 a year.  Id.  However, thanks in part to the precipitous fall of oil prices in late 
2014 and early 2015, standard offer prices for residential and small-business customers (in Central 
Maine Power’s territory, covering most of southern and central Maine) fell 13.4 percent to 6.54 cents 
per kWh.  Tux Turkel, Price pain turns to gain for many of CMP’s customers, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD (last updated Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/01/13/cmp-electric-rates-going-
down-13-percent/.  Nonetheless, should oil prices begin to rise again, the region’s continued lack of 
natural gas pipeline capacity could force standard offer prices up once more.   
 224. Examiners’ Report, supra note 218, at 36; see also, Edward D. Murphy, Maine PUC votes to 
review proposals for new natural gas pipelines, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 30, 2014, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/30/maine-puc-votes-to-review-proposals-for-new-natural-gas-
pipelines/.  On November 13, 2014, by a vote of 2 to 1, the Commissioners approved moving forward 
with the review of three separate proposals for pipeline expansion into Maine.  Id.  Although there is 
continued skepticism about its effect, it has been also noted that heating prices, and the price of fuel for 
many of Maine’s companies, may continue to rise if no action is taken.  Id.  Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that the composition of the PUC changed in January 2015, with the retirement of Chair Thomas 
Welch, and the appointment of Carlisle McLean—as well as the promotion of Commissioner Mark 
Vannoy to Chair.  Darren Fishell, LePage nominates his top legal adviser to PUC, names Vannoy 
chairman, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 8, 2015, 2:54 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2015/01/08/politics/lepage-nominates-his-top-legal-adviser-to-puc-names-
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The procedural history of the ECRA is highly important to the Act’s practical 
impact on Maine—both as a governmental entity, and perhaps more importantly, as 
a community of rate-paying citizens.  The Examiners’ Report in this matter 
showcases the divergence of views on this matter: from pipeline companies, to 
environmental advocates, to public agencies, no person observing this matter would 
feel that the import of the issue was not understood.225  Nonetheless, the ultimate 
decision of whether or not the Maine PUC will implement an ECRC is of less 
import to this Comment than the question of whether the State of Maine possesses 
the Constitutional authority to do so in the first place.  
B.  Applying the “Modern NGA Preemption Theory” to the ECRA 
In Northern the United States Supreme Court unequivocally declared that 
States were preempted from regulating the wholesale price of natural gas, both 
directly and indirectly.226  However, Part III of this Comment presented a new test 
for determining preemption under the NGA as it relates to the wholesale price of 
natural gas.227  This theory rejects Northern’s rigid approach and posits that state 
regulations are not invalidated when they merely increase the supply of energy, 
thereby indirectly affecting the price.228  Instead, this section of Part III argues that 
state regulations of natural gas that achieve these indirect effects while pursuing the 
NGA’s overall purpose should be protected from preemption. 
There is no doubt that the ECRA’s purpose is to influence wholesale market 
rates.  This purpose is not only stated in the bill’s language,229 but also reiterated by 
its proponents,230 and its detractors; the latter using it in an attempt to invalidate 
Maine’s action all together.231  However, a proper approach to NGA jurisprudence 
demonstrates that the ECRA is not preempted.  This comment solidifies this point 
in two distinct ways. 
                                                                                                     
vannoy-chairman/.  What effect this change in composition will have on the implementation of an 
ECRA remains unclear.      
 225. The role of a stakeholder like the Tennessee Pipeline Company, whose goal is to profit from the 
sale of natural gas, is far different from that of the Conservation Law Foundation, which is strongly 
opposed to the idea of expanding the state’s dependence on natural gas.  See Cunningham, supra note 37 
(“A major natural gas build out in New England will commit our region for the rest of this century to an 
economy and lifestyle driven substantially by natural gas akin to our reliance on coal and oil in the past 
century . . . Maine simply cannot afford the many consequences of this ill-advised gamble.”).  However, 
as the author this Comment witnessed a large portion of the proceedings before the MPUC in this 
matter, it should be noted that all parties seemed to have a full grasp on the precedent-setting 
possibilities of the ECRA, and the ways in which the choice to implement an ECRC or not could impact 
both Maine ratepayers, and the natural gas industry as a whole.  
 226. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963). 
 227. See supra pp. 21-23 (a state action that produces an effect on interstate prices is not 
automatically preempted under the NGA, but instead is analyzed in the context of the NGA’s overall 
purpose for providing uniform regulation of interstate sales of natural gas and ensuring affective 
consumer protection).  
 228. Id.  
 229. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1903 (2013).  
 230. See Fredette Testimony, supra note 30.  
 231. CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 23-24 (arguing that because the ECRA expressly states its intention 
to influence wholesale rates of natural gas, the Act impinges upon FERC’s authority as outlined by the 
NGA). 
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First of all, ECRA critics fail to differentiate the type of action the Act 
proposes from the types of action that have been preempted in the past.  In this 
area, it is critical to recognize that the ECRA does not seek to regulate232 the 
expansion of natural gas pipeline capacity.233  Instead, Maine is acting in the shoes 
of a private party.  The ECRA itself does not delegate the authority to set rates, to 
override the decision of the federal government, or to otherwise act in a fashion 
that would be consistent with the type of action invalidated in Northern.  Instead, it 
potentially funds an action typically undertaken by a private party, an action 
outside of the scope of the NGA, and thus immune from preemption.  Maine is 
participating in the natural gas market in an attempt to secure a beneficial result for 
its “customer,” the people of Maine.  Although of a different scale, Maine’s action 
warrants the same constitutional scrutiny as if a large industrial company chose to 
relocate to Maine, and Maine helped to fund the construction of a smaller pipeline 
branch to feed the operation and help create jobs for a rural community.  Framed in 
this way, Maine does not need to justify the scope of its action vis-à-vis the NGA 
as only state regulatory actions must account for their effect on wholesale prices.234   
Alternatively, should Maine’s action be determined to be regulatory in nature, 
the State can distinguish the warning of Northern by using the modern NGA 
preemption theory, which does not seek to discredit Northern, but merely narrows 
the scope of the decision to a position consistent with the intent of the NGA.  The 
NGA was not drafted in a vacuum.  Instead, it was conceived with the purpose of 
creating a uniform set of regulations to govern the interstate transportation and sale 
of natural gas in order to protect the common citizen from unregulated pipeline 
companies.235  The ECRA is not inconsistent with this purpose and thus should not 
be preempted.  Instead, Maine continues to operate within its constitutionally 
protected area of influence—primarily that of ensuring the local prices for 
consumer electricity, gas, heat and water are “just and reasonable.”236  The ECRA’s 
stated intent is to reduce interstate natural gas prices.  However, its means for 
carrying out this goal are not achieved by contradicting federal regulation, but by 
increasing the supply of this fuel into the region, while still respecting the NGA’s 
stated goal of protecting consumer interests.  In theory, the resulting effect would 
be a lower price for natural gas.  Consequently, this goal and the means for its 
                                                                                                     
 232. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (10th ed. 2014) (regulation: “Control over something by rule 
or restriction.”).  This Comment draws the distinction between an act that forces certain activities to 
occur, and the ECRA, which involves the process of allowing the State to act in the capacity of an 
otherwise regulated actor to purchase pipeline capacity.   
 233. The construction of interstate natural gas pipelines is under the sole jurisdiction of FERC.  15 
U.S.C. § 717(b) (2005).  
 234. See generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the 
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).  Finding 
that the ECRA presented a type of action outside the scope of NGA analysis, would allow a reviewing 
court to dispense with the case without undergoing the constitutional analyses discussed within the 
Comment.  This constitutional avoidance, or Ashwander Principle, has been preferred by the courts over 
the years and could steer a court away from invalidating the law or opening up a constitutional 
Pandora’s box by validating a new test of NGA preemption.  
 235. See Pierce, supra note 53, at 62.  
 236. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 301(2) (2014).  
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achievement are both consistent with the emphasis placed on consumer protection 
by the NGA,237 and supported by the Third Circuit’s distinction of “supply and 
demand” in Solomon.     The decision in Solomon conceived of a situation where 
the simple increase of fuel capacity would have an indirect effect on the resulting 
interstate wholesale price of that fuel.  Some have doubted the ability of Maine’s 
actions to change the price of natural gas.238  Nonetheless, the theory behind the 
ECRA is precisely the type of situation envisioned in Solomon.  As the Third 
Circuit noted, FERC may have exclusive authority over interstate rates – both 
under the FPA and the under the NGA—but this authority “does not carry with it 
exclusive control over any and every force that influences [these rates.]”239  Unlike 
the regulations invalidated in Northern, Nazarian, and Solomon, Maine is not 
crossing the Rubicon that divides federal and state regulatory authority.  It is not 
mandating240 a change in producer behavior, nor is it not overriding FERC-
approved cost structures.  More importantly, Maine’s action under the ECRA is not 
dictating a new price for wholesales of natural gas carried in interstate commerce.  
This power, at the heart of the NGA, remains at the sole discretion of FERC.  In 
theory, this action has the potential to change the overall wholesale price of natural 
gas in the region.  However, it seems highly unlikely that the state’s action in this 
context would give rise to cries of preemption, because though its actions may 
affect the wholesale price of natural gas, in no way is such action inconsistent with 
FERC’s regulatory regime.  
This distinction shows the wisdom of Solomon.  The Third Circuit correctly 
recognized that failing to limit the otherwise-absolute scope of Northern could 
produce dire consequences for individual states.  By distinguishing the “law of 
preemption” from the “law of supply and demand” the court correctly recognized 
the concern that without a limiting principle, a “firestorm of litigation”241 could 
ensue, challenging each and every state practice that sought to increase the supply 
of affordable fuel in order to protect citizens from the volatility of the market.  
Such an outcome cannot be considered consistent with the past intent of Congress, 
especially following the NGPA’s rollback of federal price controls.242 
                                                                                                     
 237. See DeVane, infra note 284, at 39-40.  
 238. See CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 15-17.  Ironically, if CLF’s theory was vindicated and an 
ECRC had no effect on natural gas prices, this entire Constitutional exercise would be for not.  When 
conducting an analysis relying on Northern and its progeny, it is necessary for state action to produce 
either a direct or indirect effect on wholesale prices.  Without a resulting effect, state action is not at risk 
of treading on federal priorities.      
 239. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 240. However, an argument could be made that the Act induces a change in behavior.  The current 
PUC order, Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for Exercising Authority Pursuant 
to the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 35-A M.R.S. §1901, No. 2014-71, Order – Phase 1 (Me. 
P.U.C. Nov. 13, 2014) at 1 [hereinafter Phase 1 Order], authorizes a request for proposals to parties 
interested in building new pipeline capacity, which Maine could subsequently buy.  Considering the fact 
that Commission staff had acknowledged the existence of market failure, infra note 243, the State 
offering to buy new capacity should spur action from market participants that would not have otherwise 
occurred.   
 241. Brief of Connecticut Utilities Regulatory Authority et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellants, PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, No. 13-4330 (3d. Cir., Jan. 24, 2014).  
 242. See Williams, supra note 135, at 524. 
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C.  A Protected Species: the ECRA is Not Preempted Under the NGA 
Simply put, the history of express preemption under the NGA is not consistent 
with the invalidation of the ECRA.  From Interstate to Phillips to Northern to a 
possible challenge of Nazarian, federal courts have strongly protected FERC’s 
regulatory monopoly over natural gas travelling in interstate commerce.  However, 
while the ECRA’s impact has the potential to extend beyond Maine’s borders, the 
action of purchasing additional capacity to pass into the state falls far short of 
FERC’s presumptive jurisdiction.  The ECRA does not seek to supersede the just 
and reasonable analysis conducted on a federal level, as the regulations in Solomon 
and Nazarian did.  It does not force natural gas companies to change the amount of 
gas that they pass into the wholesale market, as the State of Kansas attempted to do 
in Northern.  Instead, Maine is attempting to correct a perceived failure in the 
wholesale natural gas market.243  Thus, the simple purchase of additional natural 
gas, although indirectly affecting the wholesale price, does not intrude on the 
expressly stated intent of Congress in the NGA, therefore surviving the express 
preemption hurdle.   
Next, implied preemption is not appropriate, as the ECRA remains consistent 
with the legislative purpose of the NGA.  Finding conflict preemption is only 
appropriate if a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”244  As is summarized 
above,245 the NGA was not passed because the federal government was interested 
in regulating industry, but because the express lack of interstate regulation was 
harming customers through the charging of excessive rates.  Thus, if consumer 
protection remains paramount in a court’s conflict preemption analysis, the ECRA 
must survive.  The legislative history,246 the testimony of many parties involved,247 
numerous media pieces,248 and the express language of the Act,249 all signal the 
need to increase pipeline capacity in order to help save customers from retail 
natural gas and electricity prices that are anything but just and reasonable.   
This purpose is not hostile to that of the NGA.  In fact, it supports the overall 
purpose of the NGA in a way that FERC cannot—by entering the competitive 
market.  FERC is able to regulate the industry from a high-altitude perspective, 
                                                                                                     
 243. Examiners’ Report, supra note 218, at 31 (“The purpose of the Act is not to interfere with an 
otherwise functioning market simply to collapse the basis differential, but rather to address any market 
failure to protect Maine consumers from the present economic phenomenon whereby they are subject to 
a much higher basis differential than the rest of the country.”).  
 244. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
 245. See supra p. 12 
 246. See Fredette Testimony, supra note 30.  
 247. See Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for Exercising Authority Pursuant 
to the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 35-A M.R.S. §1901, No. 2014-71, Brief of the Office of the 
Public Advocate (Me. P.U.C. Aug. 22, 2014) at 12 (“Energy costs in Maine were 56.8% higher in 
2012/13 than in 2011/2012, primarily as a result of significantly higher costs during the winter months 
attributable to pipeline capacity constraints.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Whit Richardson, Standard Offer Electricity Prices Jump More Than 10 Percent for 
CMP, Emera Maine Customers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2014, 3:09 PM) 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/22/business/standard-offer-electricity-price-for-most-cmp-
customers-jumps-by-more-than-10-percent/.   
 249. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1903 (2013).  
342 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:2 
ensuring that interstate prices remain competitive, that no monopolies form, and 
that the market as a whole remains healthy.  However, the NGA does not provide 
the ability to help correct local market failures—the workings of intrastate markets 
and regulations were meant to be preserved.250  This is precisely the point.   
In sum, if state actions meant to protect consumers still fall within the grasp of 
FERC, and are thereby preempted, then perhaps the clear intent of the NGA is not 
so clear after all, and the dual regulatory regime of the NGA, with the express 
purpose of protecting the public interest,251 should be reexamined. 
D.  The ECRA Represents A New Wave of Federalism in Energy Planning That 
Should be Encouraged 
In the area of constitutional law, the conception of the states as laboratories of 
democracy is at risk of becoming a cliché.252  However, with increased worries 
about global warming, and the cost of every-day electricity for consumers, the role 
of the state in crafting adequate policy solutions has never been more important.  
To be sure, the need for an overarching regime to regulate the energy sector in its 
interstate workings is also important.  After all, it was the lack of such a system that 
prompted the genesis of the NGA.  However, the power of the federal government 
can and should only go so far—and to ignore the role of each individual state in 
aiding in this overall endeavor is critical.  Thus, a proper preemption analysis must 
consider this complimentary role of the state, and how invalidation would quash its 
inherent value.   
This interplay should also be considered if and when a challenge of the ECRA, 
or a similar state law comes to the fore.  Part of the beauty of allowing for state 
experimentation is that a state is (theoretically) more knowledgeable with regard to 
local issues, and is more responsive to the needs of individual citizens.  Thus, an 
effective preemption analysis must seek to balance the relative benefits of state 
involvement with the preservation of a comprehensive federal regime, or even 
favor the involvement of local regulatory authorities in resolving a novel issue.253   
                                                                                                     
 250. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947) (“The [NGA] takes no authority 
from State commissions, and is so drawn as to complement and in no matter usurp State regulatory 
authority.”).  
 251. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2009).  
 252. See New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To 
stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to 
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).    
 253. See Note, Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal Energy Statutes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1306, 1307-08 (1990) (“An economic approach to [preemption analysis] views federalism as a 
functional balance of competing sources of law; courts can compare the benefits of local flexibility with 
those of federal uniformity.  Advantages of state regulation include not only quicker responses to local 
needs and greater political accountability, but also experimentation with a broader variety of regulatory 
approaches.”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism and Administrative 
Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 670 (1985) (“It is in the 
national interest to permit each state to adopt its own regulatory policy to the extent that such state 
decisions affect only, or predominantly, the interests of state residents.”); C. Boyden Gray, Regulation 
and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 93 (1983) (“[T]here should be a presumption in favor of state or 
local operation of regulatory programs.”).  
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The ECRA is a prime example of this phenomenon.  In a stated attempt to aid 
families and businesses, Maine is acting as a prudent investor would, purchasing a 
commodity for which there is a significant demand, in hopes of reducing its 
wholesale price.  Just as in Solomon,254 states in a federal system should be able to 
choose which types of electricity generation to build, and likewise, they should be 
able to choose which types of fuel should power that generation.255  This balance 
between the authority between state borders and state authority within those borders 
is precisely the type of regime envisioned by the NGA.  Thus, preserving a space 
for state experimentation in this most volatile and important of areas is within in 
the best interests of all those involved, particularly consumers.  As such preemption 
cannot, and should not be, a tool used by FERC to quash novel experiments in 
energy policy, whose effects would not expand into the region of interstate 
commerce.  Instead, they should be encouraged, and facilitated in a manner 
consistent with the keeping prices of energy just and reasonable for each and every 
citizen.  The ECRA’s furtherance of this objective bolsters its constitutional 
legitimacy.      
E . One More Bump in the Road: Dealing with the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the ECRA is not preempted by the NGA, it has 
been argued that the Act is invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.256  
Initially conceived by Chief Justice John Marshall,257 the dormant Commerce 
Clause is not an express constitutional provision, but a logical offshoot of the 
exclusive power of Congress to regulate the use, channels, instrumentalities, and 
activities, which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.258  Because 
Congress has exclusive authority over these broad categories, a State is not 
permitted to enact laws or regulations that benefit local interests at the expense of 
out-of-state interests.259  State laws that expressly discriminate against out-of-state 
interests are per se unconstitutional.260  This presumption can only be overcome if a 
                                                                                                     
 254. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 255. To be clear, this Comment does not advocate reversal of the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Solomon.  However, the facts in Solomon spotlight how states can shape their own energy policies by 
investing in certain types of generation.  Of course, this “investment” cannot interfere with, or otherwise 
displace federal priorities.  
 256. See CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 23.   
 257. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 199-200 (1824) (“[W]hen a State proceeds to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is 
granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.”).  
 258. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).  
 259. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatona, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 575-76 
(1997) (holding that a state tax exemption for charitable organizations violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it specifically benefited organizations that served in-state clientele instead of out-of-state 
clientele); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1935) (holding a law that required 
dealers of milk to pay out-of-state producers the same minimum price has dealers were required to pay 
in-state producers an unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).   
 260. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that a state law 
which forbade the importation of waste from other states was unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause); see also Whelton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281 (1875) (finding a state law which forbade the 
importation of any goods from out-of-state to be in violation of the Commerce Clause); H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (holding that the denial of a license to operate a daily and 
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state demonstrates both a compelling local interest and the lack of any viable 
alternative to protect this interest.261  If, however, a law is not facially 
discriminatory, it may still be invalidated if it was passed with a discriminatory 
purpose, or produces a discriminatory effect.262  In these cases, the Court will 
employ the Pike263 balancing test, which attempts to ascertain whether the benefits 
of a law for local interests outweigh the burdens it places on interstate 
commerce.264    
However, the dormant Commerce Clause only applies to a state’s regulatory 
actions, and as such, the Court has consistently found that a state’s direct actions as 
a market participant are not subject to the traditional Commerce Clause analysis.265  
In fact, the frequency of states acting as market participants has become so 
common that modern courts often treat the market participant exception as a 
threshold question before employing the traditional dormant Commerce Clause 
tests.266  Thus, “[the] [i]mpact on out-of-state residents figures in the equation only 
after it is decided that the [State] is regulating the market rather than participating 
in it, for only in the former case need it be determined whether any burden on 
interstate commerce is permitted by the Commerce Clause.”267 
Recent regulations in the context of energy and the environment have been 
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause.  For example, the United States 
Supreme Court in 1992 invalidated a state law that required electricity generators to 
                                                                                                     
creamery to an out-of-state company, despite the company’s successful completion of every applicable 
step, violated the Commerce Clause). 
 261. Maine. v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).  The Court allowed Maine to ban the importation of 
non-native baitfish.  The State successfully proved that there was no other way to prevent various 
invasive species of baitfish from being introduced into non-native habitats other than their outright ban.  
To date, Taylor remains the only instance of a State successfully overcoming strict scrutiny in this 
context. 
 262. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wa. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating a state 
law that required all imported apples to only bare USDA classifications, as this indirectly discriminated 
against out-of-state producers).  
 263. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 132, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce, are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”).  
 264. Id.; see also Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 
(1943).  In both instances, the Court held that the burdens placed on petroleum producers and raisin 
producers respectively were not significant enough to outweigh local interests that they sought to 
protect.  
 265. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (“Nothing in the purposes 
animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of congressional action, from 
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”); see also 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding South Dakota’s ability to charge less to in-state 
purchasers of cement than out-of-state purchasers, because the state-owned company was directly 
participating in the cement market).  The only limit to the exception is that a State may not attach 
discriminatory conditions to any sale it conducts while participating in the market.  South-Central 
Timber Dev. Corp. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984).  
 266. See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employ., Inc. 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983) (“[C]ourts treat 
the question of whether the state is acting as a market participant as a threshold question for dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.”).  
 267. Id. 
2015] THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED 345 
purchase a percentage of their fuel supply from in-state sources.268  More recently, 
concerns have been raised of the potentially discriminatory impact of state 
“renewable portfolio standards” (“RPSs”), which seek to incentivize the 
construction of renewable electricity generation by providing tax credits and other 
state-provided incentives.269  The argument is raised that incentivizing in-state 
development of renewable energy implicitly discriminates against out-of-state 
alternatives.270  In this vein, a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a state law that regulated a number of carbon-based 
pollutants.271  Overturning the district court,272 the Ninth Circuit held that the law 
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, as it regulated pollutants based on 
their carbon content and impact on the environment, not on their point of origin.273  
In addition, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado upheld a 
state law that required each Colorado-based utility to produce at least 10 percent of 
its annual electricity sales from renewable sources.274  Despite the fact that the 
Colorado law might affect the bottom-line of some out-of-state companies, the 
court held that the standards did not impose enough of a burden on interstate 
commerce to be struck down.275  Beyond these two examples, however, the area of 
the dormant Commerce Clause has rarely been explored in the context of state 
                                                                                                     
 268. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 444 (1992).  Oklahoma had traditionally imported all of 
the coal needed to fuel its power plants.  However, its legislature instituted a law that required all gas-
fired generators to purchase at least 10 percent of its supply from Oklahoma-based companies.  The 
Court applied strict scrutiny due to the facially discriminatory nature of the bill, and found that the 
interest could be achieved in other ways, thus invalidating the law.  Id. at 456.  
 269. See William Griffin, Renewable Portfolio Standards and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The 
Case for In-region Location Requirements, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 133, 133 (2014).   
 270. Id. at 134.  
 271. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 
2875 (2014) (holding, among other things, that California’s low-carbon fuel standards were not facially 
discriminatory (as would violate the dormant Commerce Clause) because they did not differentiate 
between pollutants on the basis of their origin, but instead on the basis of their carbon content).   
 272. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078.  
 273. Id. at 1093 (“The dormant Commerce Clause does not require California to ignore real 
differences in carbon intensity among out-of-state ethanol pathways, given preferential treatment to 
those with a higher carbon intensity.  These factors are not discriminatory because they reflect the 
reality of assess and attempting to limit GHG emissions from ethanol production.”).  
 274. Energy and Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB, 2014 WL 1874977, at *2 
(D. Colo. May 9, 2014).  The USDC for the District of Minnesota also explored the constitutional 
implications of a law that forbade the construction of new coal-fired generation without the necessary 
carbon offsets.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F.Supp.3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014).  However, because the 
court found the law to be preempted by the FPA, the additional dormant Commerce Clause challenge 
was not explored.  Commentary and synopsis of both these cases can be found in Alexandra B. Klass, 
State Energy Policy and the Commerce Clause: Spotlight on Colorado and Minnesota, ENERGY LAW 
PROFESSOR BLOG (May 21, 2014), http://energylawprof.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/state-energy-policy-
and-the-commerce-clause-spotlight-on-colorado-and-minnesota/.  Additionally, a full-scale analysis of 
both cases, the statutes that begot them, and the issue of RPSs and the dormant Commerce Clause 
generally has been conducted.  Its conclusions are split, and hinge more on states’ ability to draft 
legislation in a way that prevents attack, rather than on the Constitutional validity of RPSs as a whole.  
Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting 
the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013).   
 275. Epel, 2014 WL 1874977 at *6 (“The dormant Commerce Clause neither protects the profits of 
any particular business, nor the right to do business in any particular manner.”).  
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energy regulations, and has not been explored to date in the area of natural gas.     
Nonetheless, the dormant Commerce Clause does not present an obstacle to 
the ECRA. In fact, it does not even provide a bump in the road.  First and foremost, 
the ECRA does not discriminate against out-of-state interests.  The argument has 
been raised that the ECRA violates the dormant Commerce Clause simply because 
it “places a direct burden on interstate commerce.”276  Yet, this argument not only 
misinterprets the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on the issue, but also fails to 
advance any reasons why the purchasing of natural gas pipeline capacity would 
discriminate against out-of-state interests wishing to do the same.   
Additionally, the ECRA does not facially or effectually discriminate against 
out-of-state interests, in fact it encourages the use of regional and local strategies if 
such efforts might lead to “lower natural gas prices and, by extension, lower 
electricity prices for consumers in Maine.”277  Secondly, it is hard to envision a 
situation where the introduction of additional pipeline capacity, either into New 
England as a region, or into Maine as a state, would produce the necessary 
discriminatory effect in order to invalidate the ECRA in line with Wyoming, Hunt, 
or Dean’s Milk.  The ECRA does not privilege a Maine natural gas company, or 
pipeline provider over an out-of-state competitor, nor does it establish any method 
by which Maine interests would be elevated over those of New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, or Rhode Island.  Rather, the ECRA 
establishes a process and a framework by which Maine will hopefully reduce its 
energy bills.  No scenario, at least that can be envisioned at this point in time, 
produces the type of effect necessary for an aggrieved party to bring suit under the 
dormant Commerce Clause; producing a “direct burden on interstate commerce”278 
is not enough.  
Finally, although not necessary at this juncture, the ECRA has an emergency 
hatch through which it could escape invalidation under the dormant Commerce 
Clause: the market participant exception.  As the Maine PUC staff has already 
admitted, the current alignment of the private market is not producing the necessary 
result. 279  Despite the obvious lack of capacity resources to transport natural gas 
into both Maine, and New England, the private market has not solved the problem.  
                                                                                                     
 276. CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 23-24. 
 277. See generally 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1930(2); SUSSEX REPORT, supra note 212, and accompanying 
text.  The modus operandi for the past year has been that as the lack of natural gas pipeline capacity was 
a regional problem, that a collective regional strategy was the best way to solve it.  The letter released 
by all six New England governors on December 5, 2013, spoke to this exact issue: “New England 
ratepayers can benefit if the states collaborate together to advance our common goals.  The Governors 
therefore commit to continue to work together, in coordination with ISO-New England and through the 
New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE), to advance a regional energy infrastructure 
initiative that diversities our energy supply portfolio while ensuring that the benefits and costs of 
transmission and pipeline investments are shared appropriately among the New England States. Press 
Release, New England Governors’ Commitment to Regional Cooperation on Energy Infrastructure 
Issues (Dec. 5, 2013) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.nescoe.com/uploads/New_England_Governors_Statement-Energy_12-5-13_final.pdf. 
Additionally, all of NESCOE’s letters, memoranda, and other materials relating to a regional 
infrastructure effort are cataloged at http://www.nescoe.com/Regional_Infrastructure.html (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2014, 3:41 pm).        
 278. See CLF Brief, supra note 41, at 23-24.  
 279. See Examiners’ Report, supra note 218, at 31.   
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Thus, the solution proposed by the Maine Legislature by way of the ECRA is for 
Maine to pick up the slack and partially finance the type of pipeline expansion that 
would theoretically reverse the currently unfavorable basis differential.  In this 
way, Maine is not regulating the transport of natural gas.280  Instead, Maine is 
attempting to plug the hole vacated by the usual market participants; it is 
attempting to purchase enough capacity to unilaterally reverse the ever-escalating 
price of natural gas in the Northeast.  As the Court stated so clearly in White, this 
activity amounts to participating in the market, rather than regulating it, and thus 
the Commerce Clause does not apply.281                
In sum, no part of the ECRA, or a potential contract that Maine might enter 
into, poses a threat to out-of-state interests.  Instead, it represents a measure that 
could, if successful, constitutionally and lawfully benefit not just Maine, but most 
of its similarly starved neighbors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A.  In Summary 
Federalism is a delicate balance, especially when energy policy is involved.  
Although each state has its own needs and ideas on how to meet them, they all 
must fit into an intricate puzzle to enable the country to function as a whole.  
Originally, the interest and jurisdiction of the states were given preference, while 
the power of Congress to regulate “interstate commerce” was pruned to the 
extreme.282  Yet the emergence of large industry, the need for far-reaching 
oversight, and perhaps the influence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, all began 
to swing the balance in the other direction, and the broad power of federal 
government to regulate large-scale commerce began to come into fruition.283 
It was in this era of a more expansive commerce power that both the Natural 
Gas Act and the Federal Power Act were passed.  However, the passage of both 
Acts was not intended to be a federal power grab—instead, both Acts were meant 
to bridge the divide left between states, and to provide a general safety net for 
consumers.284  In the wake of Kansas Gas,285 the need for comprehensive federal 
                                                                                                     
 280. Such regulation, of course, would necessarily be preempted by the NGA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
717(a).   
 281. See supra note 266.   
 282. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (invalidating a federal regulation 
on the working conditions of sugar workers, which the federal government attempted to pass under its 
Commerce Clause power); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the regulation 
of working conditions and the imposition of a minimum wage on the coal industry had no relation to 
interstate commerce and thus could not be passed pursuant to Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause).  
 283. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce 
is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection and advancement; to adopt measures to 
promote its growth and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control, and restrain.”).   
 284. See Dozier A. DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and 
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 30, 34 (1945) (“It was the expressed desire of 
[President Roosevelt] and of the majority leaders in Congress, that any legislation enacted by Congress 
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legislation was clear; however, like the government’s assertion of control over 
interstate electricity sales three years prior, the Natural Gas Act was merely meant 
to aid, rather than intrude upon state regulatory authority.286  Further, the passage of 
the NGA was considered to be a hedge for states’ interests in regulating natural gas 
companies, rather than a broad-scale usurpation of states’ rights.287  This context is 
extremely important when analyzing current state efforts to improve the public 
good by way of state energy procurement and planning programs.  The need for 
affordable, dependable energy has been a concern of elected officials and common 
voters alike for many, many years.  The glut of natural gas in the mid-Atlantic and 
increased concerns over global warming have only intensified the public’s attention 
on energy policy as a whole.288  Yet, while federal priorities are clear as mud, the 
opportunity exists for states to take the initiative.   
Maine’s passage of the Energy Cost Reduction Act is a prime example.  
Saddled with increasing electricity bills and confronted with the closure of large-
scale industry, due in part to the inexorable rise in natural gas prices, the Maine 
Legislature saw the need for action.  The debate over the potential effect of new 
natural gas capacity has been spirited and highly informative, and although a 
conclusion has not been reached, the process exemplifies the potential for state 
actions within the context of national energy markets to provide beneficial results 
for state-specific consumers.   
Whether Maine will ever enter into a capacity contract for natural gas is 
uncertain, and whether such an investment would be prudent, or disastrous, is not 
within the scope of this Comment.289  What should not be in doubt, however, is the 
State of Maine’s ability to pass this bill, free of conflict with federal statutes, or the 
Constitution itself.290  This Comment has explored the development of federal 
                                                                                                     
should be of a character that would aid in securing reasonable consumer rates, but that such legislation 
should not divest state commissions of their power . . . .”).   
 285. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.  
 286. See DeVane, supra note 284, at 39-40.  
 287. Id. at 41 (“Under these two Acts the Federal Government is pioneering in the field of federal 
cooperation with state commissions in an effort to establish more effective regulation under our dual 
form of government.”).  
 288. See Stephen Ansolabehere & David Konisky, Energy: What Americans really want, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/09/13/energy-what-americans-really-
want/SdM914A5hoIK4rKP2rKn3O/story.html (“Americans have a clear understanding of what types of 
energy they want to see the United States use, and what types they want to see reduced.”).  
 289. See Phase 1 Order, supra note 240, at 40-41; see also supra note 27; Fishell, supra note 224.  As 
of the drafting of this Comment, the Maine PUC has agreed to move into Phase II of procuring an 
ECRC.  Phase 1 Order, supra note 240, at 36.   It will now solicit bids from interested pipeline 
companies and will review them as soon as possible.  Id.  When reviewing bids, the Commission will 
review the price, the timeline of a particular project, and most importantly, the potential for a purchase 
of natural gas capacity to produce a “net benefit” for the people of Maine in the resulting reduction in 
price for natural gas and electricity.  Id. at 38-39.  However, this progress is, to a certain extent, 
contingent on the actions of the new PUC who will begin work in the Spring of 2015. 
 290. This conclusion would hold true for other state-sponsored purchases of generation assets or 
capacity.  Although not tested in these areas to this point, the key commonality between the ECRA and 
an analogous state action is whether the state sought to increase the supply of a certain resource rather 
than usurping a federally regulated price.  However, each case will have its own intricacies and nuances 
that will have to be analyzed under both the modern preemption theory, and perhaps the market 
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, in due course.  
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regulation of natural gas, as well as the general history and criteria of both 
preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges to similar state actions.  
Through this analysis, the Comment has concluded that a state action like the 
ECRA is, in fact, the type of initiative that the NGA regime sought to enable and 
preserve.    
First, this Comment argued that the act of purchasing pipeline capacity is 
wholly market-based in nature, rather than regulatory, thereby eliminating the need 
to conduct any preemption analysis.291  However, in the alternative, this Comment 
asserted that a state’s attempt to increase the supply of a federally regulated fuel is 
not preempted either.292  The plain language of the NGA protects the ability of state 
commissions to regulate intrastate matters, even if they concern natural gas initially 
transported through interstate commerce.293  This reservation of state authority is 
indicative of the times, but also the overall intention of the act.  The federal 
government intended to foster a competitive market while protecting the interests 
of consumers, and in doing so, protecting the sovereign authority of states and their 
commissions, which had been in place prior to enactment of the NGA and FPA.294   
Second, this Comment has highlighted the fact that state actions may produce 
an effect on interstate energy rates without coming into conflict with federal 
priorities.  The modern theory of conflict preemption under the NGA furthers the 
historical view that state and federal interests were meant to work in unison to 
solve a common goal, rather than be consistently at odds.  Judge Williams has 
suggested, and this Comment’s analysis confirms, that state laws, which affect, 
rather than regulate, intrastate natural gas supplies and pricing do so in a way that is 
congruent with, not adverse to, federal regulation under the NGA.295  In particular, 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Solomon distinguishes the law of supply and 
demand from the law of preemption, highlighting the clear difference between a 
policy that directly regulates a wholesale price and a policy that attempts to 
influence the price by increasing the supply of a certain energy resource.296   
This modern theory does not revolutionize this area of law; it merely shines a 
light on what was already there.  History shows that the federal government’s 
interest in controlling the wholesale price of natural gas was never intended to 
undermine state authority; thus, there is no reason why the NGA should effectively 
prevent states from acting in their own best interest, when this interest does not 
adversely affect the industry at large.297  More to the point, an indirect effect on 
wholesale price should never be the principal ground on which a state initiative is 
invalidated.298  Instead, a comprehensive analysis of the effect, and its ability to 
                                                                                                     
 291. See supra Part IV(b), at 28-30.  
 292. See supra Part IV(c), at 31-32.  
 293. 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (2014).   
 294. See DeVane, supra note 284, at 39-40; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 
672, 683-84 (1954). 
 295. See supra notes 171-175.   
 296. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 297. See Pierce, supra note 253, at 670 (1985) (“It is in the national interest to permit each state to 
adopt its own regulatory policy to the extent that such state decisions affect only, or predominantly, the 
interests of state residents.”).  
 298. Of course, this excludes effects like those explored in Nazarian, or other state initiatives where 
states frustrate the wholesale rates regulated and set by FERC.  This Comment is not advocating for the 
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coexist with federal priorities, must be the norm.299  This view is not only 
indicative of this country’s federalist underpinnings,300 but the desires of Congress 
identified in the NGA.301  States have a valuable role to play in today’s energy 
policy, and given the traditional preference for complementary state action in this 
area, it does not square with history for the NGA to be used as a tool for silencing 
state initiatives.   
Finally, this Comment concludes that the ECRA does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  In this area, Maine does not act as a regulator, but instead acts 
as a market participant.  As such, the market participant exception exempts the 
ECRA from Commerce Clause oversight.302  Furthermore, the ECRA does not 
discriminate against out-of-state interests in favor of Maine interests.  While it does 
act in order to benefit the people of Maine, it will not burden commerce in another 
state, but may in fact benefit other states by decreasing the basis differential on 
natural gas flowing into New England.   
In sum, the ECRA is constitutional.     
B.  What next? 
Energy policy is central to the everyday life and future of this country.  Sound 
policy decisions to confront this reality require consistency and a clear 
interpretation of which types of actions are constitutionally permissible.  This 
Comment has identified a type of state action—the purchase of natural gas pipeline 
capacity—that on its face survives constitutional scrutiny.  However, Circuit Courts 
have only spoken in dicta on this issue, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule.  
Thus, the question remains: what, if anything, can be done to clarify this apparent 
ambiguity.    
Barring an immediate clarification of this issue by the Supreme Court, the 
most sensible way to enforce this modern theory of NGA preemption is by way of 
amending the Natural Gas Act.  This would not represent a major overhaul of 
federal regulatory priorities, but would clearly establish the complimentary role 
that states must play in this area.  It would not attempt to curtail federal initiatives, 
but would simply clarify that state actions regarding the purchase of additional 
                                                                                                     
hijacking of federal priorities in any way—this, of course, is immediate ground for preemption.  Instead, 
this Comment proposes that the line between state and federal involvement in energy regulation is too 
rigid and formulaic.  This view is not consistent with history, nor does it help facilitate the type of 
innovation and consideration of the type of unique programs that some states are in fact moving forward 
with.  The ECRC is a prime example.  
 299. See Williams, supra note 135, at 536.  
 300. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Convention (June 24, 1788) (“While 
the Constitution continues to be read and its principles known the States must by every rational man be 
considered as essential, component parts of the Union; and therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to 
the latter is wholly inadmissible.”).  
 301. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 332 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1947) (“The 
[NGA], though extending federal regulation, had no purpose or effect to cut down state power.  On the 
contrary, perhaps its primary purpose was to aid in making state regulation effective, by adding the 
weight of federal regulation to supplement and reinforce it in the gap created by prior decisions.  The 
Act was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap or 
delete it in any way.”).     
 302. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). 
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natural gas, or other resource, that create an indirect effect on wholesale energy 
prices, are not preempted under the NGA.  Should a state attempt to decrease its 
carbon footprint by building its own wind turbines or bio-mass generators, or by 
adopting its own carbon fuel standard, the role of the federal government should be 
to encourage such investment, rather than relying on an “indirect effect” on 
wholesale electricity or natural gas prices to shoot such measures down.303  
Likewise, if a state wishes to divest itself of more fossil fuels, and help build 
different types of generation assets, the resulting effect on natural gas or oil prices 
would certainly not frustrate any federal regulatory scheme.  This fundamental 
ability of states to act within their own borders is essential to the proper functioning 
of our system of governance.  Thus, this clarification is not only aligned with the 
traditional purpose of the NGA and FPA, but is necessary to enable states like 
Maine to act in the best interest of their citizenry.  Planning for large-scale 
legislation and investments like an ECRC can take years, but this process should 
not be dampened or impinged by an overly formalistic reading of the NGA.   For 
this reason, formally codifying the modern theory of conflict preemption is 
imperative.304 
This is the beginning of a new era in American energy policy.  States like 
Maine are leading the way by taking novel approaches that have the real potential 
to benefit the public interest.  The ECRA represents “an unprecedented and 
remarkable approach”305 to reducing household energy burdens—particularly for 
those living with financial insecurity—and helping to entice new industries to 
relocate to the State to help create jobs and revive a once vibrant economy.  
Regardless of the outcome, Maine (and New England) has presented an example of 
what states can achieve—bold investments seeking to benefit each and every 
citizen.  In an age of a divided and often-paralyzed Congress, decisive state action 
might just be the remedy for which this nation’s energy and climate crisis has been 
looking.306 
  
                                                                                                     
 303. See N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963). 
 304. This is not to suggest that states should receive carte blanche.  FERC would certainly maintain 
oversight in regards to the building of new natural gas pipelines, or the safety of a different type of 
generation resource.  The underlying theory, however, is that states should be expressly enabled to 
contrive and debate the merits of a particular initiative that will benefit those living within that state’s 
borders without fear of unwarranted constitutional challenges that not only waste judicial resources, but 
which directly contradict the intention of Congress in passing the FPA and the NGA in the first place.   
 305. Tux Turkel, New England governors start push to cut cost of power, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD 
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/01/23/governors_craft_plan_to_develop_gas_and_ 
electric_resources/ (quoting Tom Welch, the past chairman of the Maine Public Utilities Commission, 
who was very influential in both the regional and state efforts to increase pipeline capacity to Maine).  
 306. Nonetheless, the authority of states to act differs dramatically depending on the type of action.  
Although the mode of analysis proposed by this Comment could be mirrored for other state attempts to 
increase the supply of certain fuels, the ability of states to act under other federal regimes, e.g. Clean Air 
Act, Clean Water Act, etc. is not explored here, and this Comment does not purport to offer a mode of 
analysis for any state action in the realm of environmental or energy law.  For example, the federal 
priorities embodied in these pieces of legislation are different from those enacted via the NGA and FPA.  
As such, further analysis must apply on separate case law and statutes; this could, of course, lead to an 
opposite outcome.     

